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Abstract
After the Irish property boom peaked in 2007, Ireland’s banks faced declining share prices
and increasing liquidity pressures. When in the aftermath of the September 2008 collapse of
Lehman Brothers, Ireland’s banks lost access to liquidity from abroad, it triggered a banking
crisis in the country. In spite of various responses by the Irish government, the financial
viability of Ireland’s banks (as well as the government’s fiscal position) continued to
deteriorate in early 2009. The Irish government attributed the problem to impaired real
estate assets sitting on bank balance sheets, which made it difficult for markets to believe
that government’s upcoming capital injections would render the banks solvent. In response,
the government created the National Asset Management Agency (NAMA), a majority
privately owned asset management company (AMC), to remove these assets from the banks.
The ownership structure was complex, being nominally privately owned so that NAMA
would not appear on the government balance sheet. Most of the powers and benefits from
ownership were structured so that they would accrue to the state. From its establishment
under the NAMA Act on December 21, 2009, NAMA purchased assets with a face value of
approximately €77.4 billion for €31.7 billion. As of December 31, 2018, it had disposed of all
but €2.3 billion of these assets. NAMA was considered one of the best performing AMCs of
the era and enjoyed an expansive legal mandate, but it was not sufficient to solve Ireland’s
economic woes. Although NAMA was still operating as of 2019, it was projected to wind
down by 2025 (having submitted a detailed wind-down plan by the end of 2021) and yield a
profit of €4 billion.
Key Words: Asset Management Corporation, Bad Banks, Real Estate, Ireland, Guarantee,
Housing Policy

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering broad-based asset management company programs.
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National Asset Management Agency
At a Glance
In late 2008, uncertainty stemming from the Global
Financial Crisis (GFC) burst the real estate bubble
supporting Ireland’s economy and triggered a banking
crisis. Between September 2008 and April 2009, the
Irish government responded with blanket guarantees,
bank recapitalizations, and bank nationalization, but
the financial viability of the banks (as well as the
government’s fiscal position) continued to
deteriorate. Government analysts traced the
credibility problem to the impaired real estate assets
populating the balance sheets of Ireland’s largest
banks. On April 7, 2009 the government
recommended that Ireland establish a centralized,
majority privately owned asset management
company, the National Asset Management Agency
(NAMA), to remove these assets from the balance
sheets and persuade the market that its banks were
adequately capitalized. NAMA would then manage and
dispose of these assets, aiming to optimize returns for
the Irish public.
Ireland established NAMA on December 21, 2009,
under the National Asset Management Agency Act
2009. NAMA eventually purchased assets with a face
value of approximately €74.4 billion for €31.8 billion
by issuing government guaranteed securities.
Although NAMA did not prevent Ireland from
requiring an EU-IMF Programme that began in
November 2010, NAMA disposed of all but €2.3 billion
in remaining assets by the end of 2018 and projected
that it would return over €4 billion in profit to the
taxpayers by the anticipated end of its life in 2025.

Summary Evaluation

Summary of Key Terms
Purpose: To stabilize the Irish banking sector and
restore “the flow of credit […] while minimizing
the risk to the taxpayer”
April 7, 2009 (Announcement),
Launch
December 21, 2009 (Start of
Dates
operations) (First asset transfer took
place between March 29, 2010 and
May 10, 2010)
WindNAMA did not have an initial winddown
down date, but current policy is that
Dates
NAMA’s would close by the end of
2025
Size and
The government did not know the
Type of
extent of the NPL problem in
NPL
commercial loans until NAMA began
Problem
asset purchases. NAMA purchased
land and property development loans
as well as any assets related to such
loans
(both
commercial
and
residential)
Program
Not specified, but NAMA could issue
Size
up to €54 billion to purchase assets
Eligible
Any credit institution could apply to
Institutio NAMA, but the Finance Minister
ns
ultimately decided which applicants
were eligible
Usage
Assets with a face value of €74.4
billion purchased for €31.8 billion
Outcomes

Projected surplus of over €4 billion at
program termination

Ownershi
p
Structure
Notable
Features

Public-private ownership (majority
private)

The effectiveness of NAMA at stabilizing the Irish
economy is uncertain. The consensus seems to be that
Extensive legal authority (though
NAMA was effective at performing the functions asset
committed to limit use), hedged risk
management companies are expected to perform. As a
of overvaluation with claw back
whole, NAMA was considered one of the more wellmechanism, off-balance-sheet SPV
developed and commercially successful European
structure
asset management companies of the GFC era. Like the
other interventions preceding Ireland’s eventual IMF-EU program, NAMA was not enough to solve Ireland’s
financial problems. However, it was able to effectively carve out much of the toxic assets in Irish banks, making
it possible to credibly recapitalize the banks. The problem was that Ireland did not have enough fiscal room to
do this without an IMF-EU program. NAMA remained politically unpopular, having to grapple with the
combination of a perceived transparency problem and early delays that further aggravated a sense of
uncertainty.
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National Asset Management Agency (NAMA): Ireland Context
GDP
$276.5 billion in 2008
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted
$236.4 billion in 2009
to USD)
$222.5 billion in 2010
GDP per capita
$61,263 in 2008
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted
$52,105 in 2009
to USD)
$48,715 in 2010.
As of Q4, 2008
Sovereign credit rating (five-year
Fitch: AAA
senior debt)
Moody’s Aaa
S&P: AAA
As of Q4, 2009:
Fitch: AAMoody’s: Aa1 (negative outlook)
S&P: AA
As of Q4, 2010
Fitch: BBB+
Moody’s: Baa1
S&P: A*$470.0 billion in total assets in 2008
Size of banking system
$ 42.7 billion in total assets in 2009
$ 373.4 billion in total assets in 2010
Size of banking system as a percentage
169.94% in 2008
of GDP
177.85% in 2009
167.84% in 2010
Size of banking system as a percentage
100% in 2008
of financial system
100% in 2009
100% in 2010
Five-bank concentration of banking
90.7% of total assets at the end of 2008
system
90.8% of total assets at the end of 2009
87.2% of total assets at the end of 2010
Foreign involvement in banking
36.0% of total banking assets in 2008
system
35.0% of total banking assets in 2009
35.0% of total banking assets in 2010
Government ownership of banking
0% at the end of 2008
system
7.27% at the end of 2009
20.69% at the end of 2010
Existence of deposit insurance
Early 2008: 90% of deposits, maximum payout of
$27,777.78 (€20,000)
September 2008: $138,888.90 (€100,000), no coinsurance
December 2008: Unlimited
2009-10: $138,888.90 (€100,000), no co-insurance
Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; World Bank Deposit
Insurance Dataset; IMF International Financial Statistics.
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I. Overview
Background
At the outbreak of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), Ireland had a domestic banking sector
that was at least twice the size of its GDP, an open economic model, and bank governance (as
well as bank risk management) that was perceived as poor (Cas and Peresa 2016; Carroll
and Dodd 2012). Although the economy had revolved around a real estate bubble for several
years, the government was widely seen as fiscally prudent (having maintained years of
balanced budgets and over a decade of surpluses) (IMF 2015). However, its relatively small
economy depended on tax receipts structured around a set of pro-cyclical taxes that the
Governor of the Central Bank of Ireland later said in 2010 “could leave [Ireland] vulnerable
to a sudden crippling turnaround in the deficit and a rapid accumulation of debt” (Honohan
2010). These factors contributed to the GFC’s early and intense impact on the Irish economy
after the fall of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. As liquidity disappeared and the
property values buttressing the Irish economy collapsed, GDP shrunk rapidly in 2008 and
2009.
As the crisis began to spread, the government of Ireland sought to stem the contagion by
announcing an ~€440 billion blanket guarantee (over double Ireland’s GDP) of virtually all
the liabilities of six large domestic banks on September 30, 2008, called the Credit
Institutions Financial Support Scheme (CIFS); (New Bagehot 2019).3 (See Figure 3.)
However, the world gradually realized that these banks might have a solvency problem, not
just a liquidity problem.
Figure 1: Republic of Ireland Property and GDP Data from 2005 to 2019

The six participating banks were Allied Irish Banks (AIB), Bank of Ireland (BOI), Anglo Irish Bank (ANGLO),
Educational Building Society (EBS), Irish Life & Permanent (IL&P), and Irish Nationwide Building Society
(INBS).
3

549

National Asset Management Agency

Nye

Source: Central Statistics Office 2019.
Uncertainty regarding the six banks’ potential losses continued to grow (Oireachtas Inquiry
2016; Schoenmaker 2015). This uncertainty began to weigh on the sovereign (IMF 2015, 5152). In response, the Irish government nationalized Anglo Irish Bank, Ireland’s third largest
bank, with a €4 billion capital injection on January 15, 2009. It also injected €3.5 billion into
each of the two largest banks, Allied Irish Bank (AIB) and Bank of Ireland. The government
capital kept Ireland’s domestic banks alive, but impaired real estate assets on their balance
sheets continued to grow. This made raising capital from the private sector impossible,
which in turn damaged their ability to make loans (Schoenmaker 2015; Quigley 2010). On
the ground, these impaired real estate assets materialized in the form of incomplete
developments and numerous properties in a legal limbo between default and foreclosure
(Williams and Nedovic-Budic 2016).4

This was exacerbated by the fact that the Irish legal system for collecting on real estate collateral/dealing with
residential mortgages in arrears was “characterised by difficulties in collateral realisation and numerous court
adjournments” (See Cas and Peresa 2016).
4
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Figure 2: Irish sovereign bond yields diverging from the European baseline
(Germany) during the Global Financial Crisis

25

20

15

10

5

0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
-5
Ireland 5-year bond yield

Germany 5-year bond yield

Source: GFD Finaeon.
Policymakers believed the impaired real estate assets were toxic to the banks and would
continue to rattle the markets until the losses associated with the assets became clear. In
March 2009, Economist and Special Advisor to the government’s National Treasury
Management Agency (NTMA)5, Peter Bacon, proposed that the government solve the
problem by creating a “bad bank,” an asset management company that would “carve out [the
relevant] impaired assets from […] the domestic banks” (Cas and Peresa 2016; Bacon 2009a;
NAMA Business Plan 2010, 7).
The government rejected relying on recapitalization alone as the “do nothing” option that
“would not address the liquidity shortage or promote new lending” and “would increase the
risk of sovereign default” (Oireachtas Inquiry 2016). Bacon conceded that an asset guarantee
had the advantage of “no money upfront from government; no write down in banks’ balance
sheet assets.” But he argued that the increasing uncertainty (as well as the increasingly
negative market response) related to the €440 billion CIFS guarantee had increased the
The NTMA is the Irish government agency that was responsible for managing the government’s assets and
liabilities (NTMA 2019)
5

551

National Asset Management Agency

Nye

government’s borrowing costs. He noted that “the credit rating of sovereign Ireland […]
[became] inextricably bound up with the issue of Irish banks capital adequacy” (Bacon
2009).
According to Bacon, government officials acknowledged that the asset-management
approach would increase the government deficit and impose write-downs on banks that
could “adversely impact equity investors and may require them to recapitalize.” Still, they
decided on this approach because it would (Bacon 2009):
● immediately “deal with the impaired property loans on the books” of the institutions
covered by CIFS, which Bacon said “needed to be removed from the institutions
before lending in the economy could resume;”
● “improve liquidity by giving the institutions collateral in the form of Government
bonds that could be used to access ECB funding;”
● create “greater impartiality for working out problem loans,” which “might break
‘crony capitalist’ connections that otherwise impede efficient transfers of assets from
powerful enterprises” and “address public suspicion regarding the relationships
between the banks and developers;”
● be able to “manage the assets without the focus on impairment disclosure that the
banks face;” and,
● allow the banks something akin to a fresh start that would “allow management time
to be refocused on rebuilding strength particularly in core retail businesses and
maintaining their deposit bases” (Oireachtas Inquiry 2016).
On April 7, 2009, the Minister for Finance announced that the Irish government would
establish a “National Asset Management Agency […] to address the issue of asset quality in
the banking system.” The Irish government then held public consultations on draft
legislation during the August recess of the Oireachtas, Ireland’s parliament (Connolly 2017,
8). The National Asset Management Agency Act 2009 (the NAMA Act) was introduced in the
Oireachtas on September 8, 2009, and pre-notified to the EC on September 29, 2009 (NAMA
Act 2009 2009; European Commission February 26, 2010). In the Oireachtas, the NAMA Act
passed by a narrow margin on October 15, 2009, following a debate that involved an all-night
session of the House (Connolly 2017). It was then signed into law by the President on
November 22, 2009, formally established via a statutory instrument on December 21, 2009
(S.I. No. 547 2009), and notified to the EC for approval under EU guidelines on impaired asset
relief for banks as well as compliance with EU State aid rules on December 23, 2009 (NAMA
Act 2009 2009; Oireachtas 2009; European Commission February 26, 2010). The EC
approved NAMA on February 26, 2010, but required that the valuation and transfer of each
tranche of assets to NAMA had to be notified to and reviewed by the EC (European
Commission February 26, 2010). The Minister for Finance and the Board of NAMA also
fleshed out NAMA’s features through numerous statutory instruments, guidelines,
directions, and Codes of Practice over NAMA’s first few years (Oireachtas 2009; National
Asset Management Agency [Conferral Of Additional Function] Order 2010; National Asset
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Management Agency [Determination Of Long-Term Economic Value Of Property And Bank
Assets] [Amendment] Regulations 2010).
Figure 3: Major Financial Institutions based in Ireland as of 2008
Institution
Name

Total
Assets
(billions
of Euros)

Market
Share

Notable
public
stake
as of
NAMA’s
start

Bank of
Ireland

194.1

26.5%

Allied Irish
Banks

179.5

24.5%

Anglo Irish
Bank
Irish Life &
Permanent
Bank of
Scotland
Ulster
Bank
National
Irish Bank
EBS
KBC
INBS
ACCBank

88.5

ForeignOwned

CIFS
Participant

NAMA
Participant
(and NAMA
Applicant)

Liquidated
under IBRC
Act 2013

Y

Y

N

Y

Y

N

12.1%

€3.5 bn
N
(preference
Shares)
€3.5 bn
N
(preference
Shares)
100%
N

Y

Y

Y

74.3

10.1%

N/A

N

Y

N

N

54.1

7.4%

N/A

Y

N

N

N

48.7

6.6%

N/A

Y

N

N

N

28.2

3.8%

N/A

Y

N

N

N

21.4
21.1
14.4
8.4

2.9%
2.9%
2.0%
1.2%

N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

N
Y
N
Y

Y
N
Y
N

Y
N
Y
N

N
N
Y
N

Sources: Author’s Calculations; New Bagehot 2019; Oireachtas Inquiry 2016.
Program Description
NAMA’s overarching purposes and goals were set down in the NAMA Act (National Asset
Management Agency Act 2009, Revised 2018). NAMA’s mandate (which NAMA refers to as
its purpose) was set down in the NAMA Act. NAMA’s overarching mandate was to stabilize
the Irish banking sector and restore “the flow of credit […] while minimizing the risk to the
taxpayer” (NAMA 2009). The NAMA’s foundational legislation listed six aspirational goals for
NAMA:
● Clarify and force the write-downs of losses related to certain assets on the balance
sheets of systemically important organizations (Ireland’s largest domestic banks);
● Remove uncertainty about bad assets, improving the availability of credit in Ireland;
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● Protect the State’s interest in respect of its liability guarantees;
● Protect taxpayers by facilitating the restructuring of credit institutions of systemic
importance to the economy;
● Restore confidence in the banking sector;
● Contribute to Ireland’s socio-economic development (Cas and Peresa 2016; National
Asset Management Agency Act 2009, Revised 2018).
In its first annual report, NAMA described three goals it had set to accomplish the mandates
the government had given it:
● identify and expeditiously buy eligible impaired assets from participating credit
institutions;
● protect (and enhance if possible) the value of those assets in the interest of, and finally
get the “best possible achievable financial return” for, the Republic of Ireland; and
● recover all taxpayer payments for the assets as well as whatever NAMA invests to
enhance the property assets underlying those assets (NAMA Annual Report 2010).
NAMA was a statutory body6 and operated under the aegis of the Department of Finance’s
National Treasury Management Agency (NTMA). The NTMA was the Irish government
agency that was responsible for managing the government’s assets and liabilities (NTMA
2019; NAMA Annual Report 2010).7 The NAMA Act gave the agency “all powers necessary
for, or incidental to, the achievement of its purposes and the performance of its functions.”8
The Act forbade NAMA from violating the laws of any jurisdiction. It also required NAMA’s
property development activities to follow “proper planning and sustainable development as
expressed in Government policy and in any relevant regional planning guidelines […] and
development plans” (National Asset Management Agency Act 2009, Revised 2018).
As can be seen in Figure 4, NAMA operated through special purpose vehicles (SPVs) to keep
its liabilities off the government’s balance sheet. NAMA set up some of these SPVs under
Section 110 of Ireland’s Taxes Consolidation Act 1997 to minimize its tax burden (NAMA
Acquisition of Bank Assets 2010).9 The parent SPV (National Asset Management Agency
On a regulatory level, NAMA wasn’t classified as a bank and various parts of Irish competition law didn’t apply
to it (National Asset Management Agency Act 2009, Revised 2018)
7
NTMA provided (or procured) business, support, and IT services and systems to NAMA in addition to staff
that would serve as “officers” within NAMA. However, NAMA staff had to conform to the requirements for
Members related to disclosure and eligibility for acting as a director of a company outlined in the NAMA Act
(National Asset Management Agency Act 2009, Revised 2018)
8
For more detail on the difference between NAMA’s purposes, the purposes of the NAMA Act, and NAMA’s
functions, see the NAMA Act’s preambulatory clauses/recitals section, Section 10 of the Act, and Section 11 of
the Act.
9
The use of Section 110 companies in this manner was allowed under the relevant tax legislation and not
uncommon for financial companies in Ireland at this time.
6
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Investment Ltd., called NAMAIL or the Invest Co.) had an initial capitalization of €100 million
and was 51%-owned by private investors and 49%-owned by NAMA (Martin 2010).
However, NAMA’s liabilities dwarfed its capital. The 51% private equity holders had little
influence on NAMA and their return on equity was capped at 10% above the yield on Irish
government 10-year bonds (Braakman and Forster 2011).
As can be seen in Figure 4, NAMA operated through special purpose vehicles (SPVs) to keep
its liabilities off the government’s balance sheet. NAMA set up some of these SPVs under
Section 110 of Ireland’s Taxes Consolidation Act 1997 to minimize its tax burden (NAMA
Acquisition of Bank Assets 2010).10 The parent SPV (National Asset Management Agency
Investment Ltd., called NAMAIL or the Invest Co.) had an initial capitalization of €100 million
and was 51%-owned by private investors and 49%-owned by NAMA (Martin 2010).
However, NAMA’s liabilities dwarfed its capital. The 51% private equity holders had little
influence on NAMA and their return on equity was capped at 10% above the yield on Irish
government 10-year bonds (Braakman and Forster 2011).

The use of Section 110 companies in this manner was allowed under the relevant tax legislation and not
uncommon for financial companies in Ireland at this time.
10
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Figure 4: NAMA’s Corporate Structure

Source: NAMA March 31, 2010, Section 55 Quarterly Report.
Application Process
Once NAMA was established (on December 21, 2009), any credit institution, including Irish
subsidiaries of foreign credit institutions, that wished to participate had 60 days (until
February 19, 2010) to apply (Martin 2010). Five of the six major banks that participated in
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Ireland’s liability guarantee applied to NAMA for assistance. The sixth, IL&P, was heavily
exposed to the real estate industry and was dependent on wholesale funding, like the others.
However, 85% of its assets were residential rather than the commercial properties on which
NAMA focused. It based its decision on each bank’s systemic importance, financial position,
and compliance with all NAMA obligations (National Asset Management Agency Act 2009,
Revised 2018; Oireachtas Inquiry 2016a).
Ireland’s Financial Regulator11 and the Minister for Finance could require participants to
produce any report they considered necessary for monitoring compliance. After
consultations with the Governor of the Central Bank and the Financial Regulator, the
Minister for Finance could require participants to produce restructuring plans and/or
business plans by a certain time. With approval from the Minister for Finance, the Financial
Regulator could also issue directions to participants. These directions could restrict balance
sheet growth, the ability of participants to conduct mergers or acquisitions, or require
balance sheet reduction, so long as the purpose of the direction was to achieve the purposes
of the NAMA Act (National Asset Management Agency Act 2009, Revised 2018).
Identifying Eligible Assets
The Minister for Finance defined eligible bank assets using several criteria. The program
accepted “all loans issued for the purchase, exploitation or development of land as well as
loans either secured or guaranteed by land” and “some of their associated commercial loans.”
The program also accepted “financial contracts between a debtor and a participating bank
[…] that relate in whole or in part to acquired loans" (i.e. derivatives). Upon being admitted
into the NAMA program, participants would identify all their eligible bank assets for NAMA.
They would do this using a set of standardized templates that outlined legal due diligence,
information about current market value of collateral, etc. (NAMA Acquisition of Bank Assets
2010). NAMA also based its determination of whether an asset was eligible on “borrower
relationship level impairment” rather than asset level impairment.12 The Irish authorities
expected eligible assets to be “concentrated on a small number of very large real estate
developers, involved across the whole cycle of property development” (Martin 2010, 5).
NAMA then determined which eligible assets it would acquire. In its October 13, 2009, Draft
Business Plan, NAMA estimated that there were eligible assets with an initial book value of
The Financial Regulator, alternatively the Irish Financial Services Regulatory Authority, was Ireland’s single
financial regulator. It existed beneath the Central Bank of Ireland (though it had its own governance structure
with a separate board from the central bank) until October 2010, when its functions were officially absorbed
by the Central Bank of Ireland and the Financial Regulator dissolved (See “Financial regulation”, Citizens
Information,
Citizens
Information
Board,
https://www.citizensinformation.ie/en/consumer_affairs/financial_services/financial_products/financial_re
gulator.html; Honohan 2019)
12
“Borrower relationship level impairment” refers to analysis looking at the extent that liabilities under various
loans born by individual borrower were larger than the value of its underlying assets first instead of looking at
the loans from an institution-by-institution point of view, which would ignore situations where one institution
was not impaired (because they may have held a first lien mortgage) while multiple other institutions which
had given the borrower things like a second mortgage or a line-of-equity were impaired. (See
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/234489/234489_1086237_117_2.pdf)
11
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approximately €77 billion available and a current market value of approximately €47 billion.
NAMA projected it would pay €54 billion in consideration for these assets, based on an
estimate of their long-term economic value (NAMA Business Plan 2009).
Valuation and Transfer
Participants would give NAMA additional due diligence reports and other information
necessary for valuing the assets as well as the assets’ underlying security. After having
appointed experts to review the information for completeness, NAMA transferred the
information to a panel that would actually conduct the valuation.13 The panel then used
discounted cash-flow models set down by the government to calculate the current market
value of the underlying property and assets as of November 30, 2009. The panel also
calculated the “Long Term Economic Value” of the underlying property and assets, which
involved a 0-25% positive adjustment to the loan’s value. There was also a 20% limit on the
extent to which the aggregate long-term economic value calculated for all land valued in
connection to a given participant’s portfolio could exceed the portfolio’s aggregate market
value (NAMA Acquisition of Bank Assets 2010).
Once the panel of loan valuers arrived at a valuation, NAMA grouped the assets based on
their shared relationships with a given borrower rather than by bank and sorted them into
tranches for transfer (each tranche would contain all of the loans related to a certain set of
borrowers across multiple participant institutions). Each additional tranche contained a
larger number of borrowers with smaller positions. NAMA determined a transfer schedule
for each tranche and provided it to the relevant participants. This transfer schedule set down
the assets that NAMA would acquire from the relevant participant and the consideration
price NAMA would pay, which would be “the lower of the amount owed by the borrower and
the loan’s long-term economic value” (NAMA Acquisition of Bank Assets 2010, 13). Within
20 days of providing the participants with the transfer schedule, the assets would be
transferred to NAMA (National Asset Management Agency Act 2009, Revised 2018, PDF Page
74-75).
Alongside the transfer, NAMA’s Master SPV would issue government-guaranteed securities
worth 95% of the price it intended to pay for acquiring the relevant assets and perpetual
unguaranteed subordinated debt (effectively equity) worth 5% of the price it intended to
For most of the loans (those related to borrowers that did not hold the top 150 largest positions in NAMA)
experts were likely drawn from the participant banks, who were to set up specialized divisions that would
“assess and value the loans to be transferred” (Frank Connolly NAMA Land. 2017. Page 14-15). NAMA’s panel
for valuing the loans was composed of personnel from Alvarez and Marsal, Ernst and Young, FTI Consulting
Ltd,
PricewaterhouseCoopers,
and
UHY
Hacker
Young
LLP.
(See
https://web.archive.org/web/20151016162759/https://www.nama.ie/fileadmin/user_upload/documents/
Procurement/ContractAwardLoanAssocValServices.pdf.) NAMA relied on Societe Generale Securities Services
(SGSS) for external experts on valuing derivatives associated with the loans. (See
https://web.archive.org/web/20151016152359/https://www.nama.ie/about-us/our-work/procurement/.)
For the underlying real estate, NAMA appointed seven different five-organization-panels, each corresponding
to
a
certain
geography.
(See
https://web.archive.org/web/20151016162740/https://www.nama.ie/fileadmin/user_upload/documents/
Procurement/ContractAwardRealEstatePanel.pdf.)
13
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pay for acquiring the relevant assets. The Acquirer Co. would then purchase the assets by
using these securities (Carroll and Dodd 2012; Boudghene and Maes 2012). (See Figure 5.)
The participating institution could then use the government guaranteed securities as
collateral to obtain cash from the European Central Bank and redeem the subordinated debt
based on NAMA’s financial performance (NAMA Acquisition of Bank Assets 2010).
Before the NAMA Act of 2009 was passed, NAMA estimated the first transfers would begin
by December 2009 (NAMA Business Plan 2009). By February 2010, EC documents estimated
that transfers wouldn’t begin until the end of that month. During its initial approval of NAMA,
the EC estimated that NAMA would complete the transfers approximately seven months
after the EC authorization, placing the expected date of the last transfer somewhere in late
September 2010. NAMA revised its estimate for this end-date several times between 2009
and 2011, having initially estimated that purchases would take less than a year (Martin
2010).
Figure 5: NAMA’s Operating Model

Source: Boudghene and Maes 2012, 789.
Asset Management
Upon acquiring its assets, NAMA would require each relevant borrower to produce a
business plan that outlined the borrower’s financial position and strategy for repayment
(NAMA Management of Loans 2012). NAMA (or, where NAMA delegated portions of this task,
a participant) would review the business plan and could work with the borrower to decide
how the assets would be managed. This process might result in an agreement, a term sheet,
an MOU, or a number of other instruments that could contain terms setting down “a new
repayment schedule, restructuring or revision of the loans and/or a program of early
disposal.” Alternatively, this process could also result in NAMA enforcing against a borrower
(Carroll and Dodd 2012).
NAMA expected to delegate asset management duties for the vast majority of its assets to
participating banks (Connolly 2017). It also expected that it would manage the assets related
to the “largest 100/150 borrowers” itself, which made up 80% of the value of the assets
acquired. NAMA intended to monitor these large borrowers directly and leave the
administration of their loans with the participants. For the rest of the borrowers, the
participants would handle much of the monitoring and administrative duties. However,
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these participants would ultimately submit information on the borrower’s performance
history and the level of impairment of their loans to NAMA for oversight (NAMA Business
Plan 2009).
Funding Source and Estimated Returns
NAMA could fund itself by issuing debt securities for the purchase of assets or it could be
funded through the actions of the Minister for Finance or the actions of private sector
investors. The Minister for Finance could issue debt securities or lend money to NAMA from
the government’s Central Fund (Carroll and Dodd 2012). NTMA provided NAMA with
“treasury services and advice” in connection with these actions (National Asset Management
Agency Act 2009, Revised 2018).
There was a €54 billion cap on the amount of debt that NAMA could use for acquiring bank
assets and a €5 billion principal cap on the amount of debt NAMA could have outstanding for
all other purposes. This borrowing was expected to be done via the issuance of commercial
paper, not via loans from the Irish government. The NAMA Act allowed NAMA to pay up to
5% of the consideration cost (the cost of acquiring assets) by issuing subordinated debt
(National Asset Management Agency Act 2009, Revised 2018). NAMA would pay for the
other 95% of the consideration cost using state guaranteed debt securities (later referred to
as NAMA’s senior bonds) (NAMA Brief Guide 2010). The subordinated debt carried an
interest rate linked to the Irish 10-year Government Bond Yield while the interest rate of the
guaranteed debt securities was set at the six-month Euribor (NAMA Acquisition of Bank
Assets 2010).
Disposal Strategy and Timeline
NAMA estimated that it would manage the assets it acquired for 7-10 years, but (NAMA Brief
Guide 2010) NAMA and the EC did not envision when NAMA would start disposing of assets
or when said disposals would conclude (beyond NAMA’s expected December 21, 2020
termination date) (National Asset Management Agency Act 2009, Revised 2018). NAMA’s
draft business plan did not contain a disposal policy. Its policy as of June 2010 was to “reflect
market conditions in its decision as to whether to sell individual properties with the goal of
disposing of assets in a phased and orderly manner.” NAMA emphasized that it would “not
engage in any speculative hoarding of assets” (NAMA Business Plan 2010). Beyond this, the
NAMA Act specified two approaches to disposal. One was conventional disposal “in the
market for the best achievable price” (Carroll and Dodd 2012). The other involved the
securitization or refinancing of loans (Carroll and Dodd 2012).
Powers
NAMA enjoyed extensive powers to carry out its mandate, having been provided with “all
the powers necessary or expedient for, or incidental to the achievement of its purposes and
the performance of its functions” under the NAMA Act (NAMA Progress Report 2014). The
Act also specified a number of NAMA’s powers, which included but were not limited to
modified legal procedures, an ability to conduct compulsory land acquisitions, and a capacity

560

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 3 Iss. 2

to unilaterally amend loans (Martin 2010).14 NAMA also could compel applicants and
participants to provide NAMA with information that it deemed relevant. It had the ability to
enforce the disclosure of information through the High Court (Carroll and Dodd 2012).
As part of its submissions to the EC, the Irish government committed NAMA to use many of
these powers sparingly and to report annually to the EC about their use. The powers in
question tended to be those that circumvented or modified law related to real estate and
creditor-debtor relations (Martin 2010, 18-19).
Governance
NAMA was governed by a nine-member board, including two ex-officio members
(Braakmann and Forster 2011). The board’s role was to ensure that NAMA performed its
functions effectively. The board set the strategic objectives and targets and ensured that
appropriate systems and procedures were in place (Carroll and Dodd 2012). In general,
members of the Board served five-year terms and could not serve more than two consecutive
terms (National Asset Management Agency Act 2009, Revised 2018).
NAMA’s statute required that it prepare and publish online codes of practice that outlined
various elements of its operations15, which would then be approved (or modified/sent back
for revision in cases where the Minister did not approve of them) by the Minister for Finance
(National Asset Management Agency Act 2009, Revised 2018).
The EC decision, the National Asset Management Agency 2009 Act, and the regulations put
forward under said Act subjected NAMA to several forms of additional oversight. While the
Minister of Finance enjoyed oversight over NAMA through NAMA’s requirement that it issue
annual statements and accounts to them, the Oireachtas had oversight over NAMA through
the requirement that NAMA issue periodic reports on its activities and subject itself to
auditing reports, and by bringing NAMA’s executives before legislative committees (National
Asset Management Agency Act 2009, Revised 2018).
The EC maintained external oversight through the requirements that NAMA report to the EC
every six months on restructuring plans and the functioning of the program, report to the EC
and Irish competition authorities each year on the “use of NAMA’s post acquisition powers,”
and notify the EC of each tranche of assets’ valuation/transfer (Martin 2010).
NAMA had a mandate to operate “in a transparent manner […] to the extent that to do so
[was] consistent with the proper and efficient and effective discharge of” its functions
(National Asset Management Agency Act 2009, Revised 2018). NAMA also had to work with
stakeholders across multiple legal jurisdictions while attempting to secure the best possible
Ireland committed that NAMA would consult with the EC on when it would be appropriate to use its power
to unilaterally amend contracts (Martin 2010).
15
Namely, the “conduct of officers of NAMA [(which also defined what constituted misconduct in office)] […]
servicing standards for acquired bank assets […] [,] risk management, including with regard to debtors […] [,]
disposal of bank assets […] [,] and any other matter in relation to which the Minister directs NAMA to prepare
a code of practice” (Carroll and Dodd 2012).
1415
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return for the taxpayer from its assets.16 It tended to follow confidentiality policies similar
to traditional banking practices and also had to comply with the provisions of the Official
Secrets Act 1963 (NAMA Annual Report 2010). Its operations reflect this tension. For
example, a large portion of NAMA’s information was categorized as “confidential
information” under the NAMA Act and therefore was not available to the public (National
Asset Management Agency Act 2009, Revised 2018).
Coordination with other Programs
NAMA’s operations were coordinated with two other Irish government programs. First,
NAMA was coordinated with a set of capital injections for participating institutions (NAMA
Business Plan 2009). Second, NAMA coordinated with various social policies by disposing of
certain properties through sales to “public bodies and […] local authorities or housing
associations for social housing” (NAMA Progress Report 2014). This was under its mandate
“to contribute to the social and economic development of the state.”
Outcomes
Initial Implementation and Fleshing out the Program (2009-11)
Five banks ultimately applied for (and were approved for) participation in NAMA: Bank of
Ireland (BOI), Allied Irish Banks (AIB), Anglo Irish Banking Corporation Ltd (ANGLO), Irish
Nationwide Building Society (INBS), and Educational Building Society (EBS). All these banks
were covered by the 2008 blanket guarantee program. During (and after) this application
period, NAMA conducted due diligence on its largest borrowers, but realized that due
diligence (and thus the asset purchase process) would take significantly longer than initially
anticipated. NAMA’s external auditor attributed this delay to problems with the
documentation quality of NAMA’s participants (NAMA Progress Report 2014). Part of this
delay also had to do with the EC’s demand that NAMA calculate the haircuts in each tranche
on a loan-by-loan level, which prompted repeated complaints from Irish officials (Honohan
2019).
After obtaining approval from the EC in early 2010, NAMA finally began transferring assets
(NAMA Progress Report 2014). The process proceeded as follows in Figure 6.

For examples see cases like SHELBOURNE NORTH WATER STREET CORPORATION v. NATIONAL ASSET
MANAGEMENT AGENCY, et al.
16
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Figure 6: Tranche Data
Tranche

Tranche 1
Tranche 2

Date of First
Purchase

Date of Final
Purchase

Date of
EC
Approval

March 29, 2010

May 10, 2010

August 3,
2010

July 2010

August
2010

Tranches 39
July-September
2010
(the “bulk”
tranche)
Total

March 29, 2010

23, November
29, 2010

Price Paid
by NAMA
for Loans
(€ billions)

Average
Discount
Percentage
(Haircut)

7.5

51%

5.3

56%

18.9

60%

57%

March 2012

July
2014

29,

March 2012

July
2014

29, 31.7

Sources: European Commission State Aid Decisions Cases
N725/2009, N331/2010, N529/2010, and 2014/N.
Certain notable borrowers began litigation against NAMA almost immediately after the
NAMA Act passed (Connolly 2017). Some developers contested NAMA’s attempts to acquire
assets that were arguably performing (Supreme Court of Ireland 2010). This and other
disputes resulted in instances of civil litigation during that time (Connolly 2017).
The property development market suffered through twelve months of uncertainty about the
rollout and direction of NAMA. There was “a complete lack of liquidity” and industries
related to property development “absolutely stopped” from NAMA’s April 7, 2009
announcement until the first transfers of assets began in late March 2010. A number of
property developers appeared not to know what the impact of NAMA on the property market
would be (Oireachtas Inquiry 2016; Oliver and O’Hora 2010).
In mid-2010, data from the first tranche of assets indicated that NAMA’s assumptions (as
well as estimates provided by banks to NAMA) related to loan-to-value (LTV) ratios and
income producing loans continued to be overly optimistic (NAMA Business Plan 2010).
As NAMA had grappled with larger than expected haircuts and non-performing loans in May
2010, the Head of Treasury17 presented a paper stating that “in the short-term, up to October
2010, NAMA was likely to require additional funding of up to €250 million” and accordingly
recommended that NAMA adopt an additional funding strategy. Upon receiving a suggestion
from the Head of Treasury, NAMA resolved its short-term funding problems by requesting
17

The Head of Treasury was one of NAMA’s executives at the time.
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that the Minister for Finance approve a €250 million loan from the Central Fund. This loan
would be used “to create a [temporary] liquidity buffer” until NAMA implemented more
long-term funding strategies. The Head of Treasury suggested that NAMA achieve this
through two borrowing programs that would each net a maximum of €2.5 billion for
NAMA.18 One program, called the ECP programme, would issue Euro Commercial Paper
(ECP) with maturities of less than one year to help fund a liquidity buffer. The other program,
to be called the Euro Medium Term Note (EMTN), would issue Euro Commercial Paper with
one to two year maturities to finance various NAMA projects (NAMA Acquisition of Bank
Assets 2010). However, NAMA did not end up issuing any paper under these programs and
repaid its €250 million loan from the Central Fund on October 27, 2010. This was because
NAMA was able to build up enough operating funds and revenues (NAMA Annual Report
2010).
The larger than expected haircuts dealt a blow to confidence in Irish banks, as the banks’
new capital requirements were premised on the assumption that the haircuts for later
tranches would be similar to those of Tranche 1. The markets realized that the banks were
undercapitalized and the Irish government did not have much fiscal room. From May, Irish
sovereign bond spreads steadily climbed (See Figure 2). In an effort to salvage the situation,
officials sought and obtained clearance for a more simplified valuation procedure that would
allow NAMA to announce the haircuts for the remainder of its purchases by September
(Honohan 2019).
NAMA responded to these problems with the release of its first official business plan on June
30, 2010. This June 30 plan set down new projections based on multiple scenarios and relied
on less optimistic (taking the first tranche to be representative of NAMA’s remaining assets)
assumptions about the quality of NAMA’s assets. This plan also made a number of changes
to NAMA’s operations and elaborated several of its existing policies. These pointed to the
organization’s efforts to adjust to the less optimistic environment while mitigating its
reputational risks (see below). Overall, these tended to make NAMA more directly involved
in the restructuring process and the underlying management of real estate (NAMA Business
Plan 2010; NAMA Management of Loans 2012).
The 2010 Business Plan included the following operational changes, that is, reversals of
existing policies or wholly new policies. First, NAMA indicated that it would only manage the
largest 100 debtors directly, but did not discount the possibility of adding to that number
(NAMA Business Plan 2010). NAMA decided that it would acquire its participants’ €14 billion
in derivatives associated with its acquired loans (which primarily took the form of interest
rate swaps and were mostly owned by the already nationalized Anglo Irish Bank), a
substantial number of which were non-performing, for €0 (Clerkin 2010; NAMA Annual
Report 2011; NAMA Business Plan 2010; Foxe 2018).19 NAMA also noted that it would
exclusively offer certain properties to public sector bodies at its independently appraised
“minimum reserve price” for four weeks (“subject to a definite decision, contract and closing
This €2.5 billion was half of NAMA’s statutory limit of €5 billion for other borrowings.
However, there does not seem to be enough information to decisively conclude why NAMA paid nothing for
these derivatives.
18
19
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period of 90 days”) before accepting offers from the larger market.20 NAMA’s Board also set
targets for paying down NAMA’s debt fully by 2019,21 in line with its goal of collecting funds
owed by all debtors “to the greatest extent feasible.” Additionally, NAMA would advance
additional funds to debtors on a risk adjusted basis as needed “to preserve or enhance
property or complete developments which make economic sense” (NAMA Business Plan
2010).
NAMA put forward several policies one might associate with moral hazard reduction. It
resolved to foreclose on debtors that “are not in a position to service their debts and are not
considered to be viable in the context of the debtor business plan process”. NAMA also
declared it would only collaborate with debtors that were being “realistic in terms of asset
funding and of the lifestyle implications for them of NAMA support.” These debtors would
also have to accept “close monitoring” by NAMA if collaboration were to be successful
(NAMA Business Plan 2010).
Ireland runs out of fiscal space
In July, NAMA started completing and releasing haircuts for its remaining tranches, which
later became known as the “bulk tranche.” This did not stop the rising sovereign bond
spreads and the outflows of deposits. The sovereign-bank doom loop intensified in August
and September as banks drew more and more funding from the central banking system. On
November 4, the government began communications with the IMF; on November 14 the
government started talks with the EC. The Irish government asked for bail-out funding from
the Troika in December 2010 (Honohan 2019).
NAMA Begins Asset Management, Restructuring, and Disposal Operations
By the end of December 2010 NAMA had already sold around €400 million in assets, but
recorded an overall loss of €1.2 billion since its establishment. As NAMA implemented its
June 30, 2010 Business Plan, the debtor business plan process was changed to result in
agreements with NAMA where the debtor would commit to reduce its debt by 25% by 2013.
Under these agreements, debtors would also commit to adhere to “a schedule of additional
repayments at various stages over a period of up to eight years.” In return, NAMA would help
the business restructure the debt into three different loans22, sometimes containing profitsharing provisions tied to the business plan’s various milestones” (NAMA Annual Report
2010).

The “minimum reserve price,” is a term of art in the Irish real estate market defined as “the lowest price that
the vendor is prepared to accept for the property” was a determined through an independent appraisal (See
NAMA Business Plan 2010 and A word to the wise, September 22, 2011, The Irish Times, Pat Igoe,
https://www.irishtimes.com/life-and-style/homes-and-property/a-word-to-the-wise-1.606309)
21
25% paid by 2013, 40% paid by 2015, 80% paid by 2017, 95% paid by 2018, and 100% paid by 2019.
22
The first of these loans would be an interest-bearing debt bearing an interest rate of the six month Euribor
plus 2.5%. The second of these would be a "non-interest bearing debt […] with a back-end fee of up to 25%
payable to NAMA.” The third of these would be debt bearing an interest rate of "up to 4%" above Euribor"
arising from “new loans advanced for working capital and capital expenditure" (See NAMA Annual Report
2010).
20
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In 2011, asset sales related to NAMA began to accelerate (see Figure 7). There was €3.6
billion in asset sales, NAMA began to report a yearly profit, and NAMA redeemed €1.3 billion
of its senior bonds (NAMA Annual Report 2012). The organization conducted due diligence
on the vast majority of the assets it had acquired. It began intensifying its efforts to assess
debtor business plans, a stepping stone on the way to asset management and disposal
(NAMA Annual Report 2011). NAMA finished valuing its assets in March 2012 (NAMA
Progress Report 2014).
Figure 7: Comparing the Disposal Rate of Three Western European Bad Banks

Source: Moody’s Investors Service 2015.
As the European economic environment continued to deteriorate in mid-2011, and Ireland
progressed through an EU-IMF financial assistance program, NAMA began reorganizing its
operations from a focus on asset acquisition to a focus on asset management and disposal
(NAMA Annual Report 2012; European Commission 2019). Among the first of NAMA’s
actions in this process was the decision to begin outlining and implementing terms for selling
its loans as packages to larger investors (NAMA Second Progress Report 2018).
Asset Management and Disposal Operations (2012 to 2019)
In March 2012, NAMA revised its business plan again as part of a “reorganisation of
functions.” The revised plan changed the projected redemption date (the date at which
NAMA would redeem its senior bonds) from 2019 to 2020. It also decreased the 2014-2016
debt redemption targets (the amount of senior debt to be repaid over the period) by around
€3 billion (to €8 billion). Additionally, the new plan changed the €13 billion 2017-2019 debt
redemption target into a 2017-2020 debt redemption target of around €16 billion. Under
the plan, NAMA consolidated several departments into two integrated divisions (the new
Asset Management and Asset Recovery divisions). NAMA also added a commitment to
“recover all State costs over the projected ten-year life of NAMA without recourse to further
borrowing, meeting all of its future commitments out of its own resources, over the shortest
possible time span” (NAMA Progress Report 2014; NAMA Annual Report 2012).
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In April, NAMA decided to revise its enforcement of Section 172 of the NAMA Act (NAMA
Second Progress Report 2018). Section 172 prohibited “any interest in property held as
security for loans acquired by NAMA from being sold back to defaulting debtors, or persons
acting on behalf of defaulting debtors” (Houses of the Oireachtas 2019). There were
exceptions to Section 172 for sales by a borrower or receiver and sales of loans (rather than
sales of property or interests in property). NAMA provided for other exceptions to it on a
case-by-case basis when the application of the policy conflicted with NAMA’s goal of
“achieving the best financial return.” In the following months, NAMA also introduced several
smaller initiatives focused on providing vendor finance for commercial property and
deferred payment mortgages for accessible housing (NAMA Second Progress Report 2018).
NAMA was drawn into the collapse of Anglo Irish Bank and INBS in 2013. Between 2009 and
late 2010, the Irish government realized that the larger than expected haircuts would
severely damage the participants, some of which the Irish government de facto owned (INBS
and Anglo Irish Bank) as a result of capital injections. In the case of INBS, first tranche
discounts of up to 70% depleted the bank’s regulatory capital, forcing the government to
state “publicly that it did not have a future as a stand-alone entity ” (Murphy 2013). Anglo
and INBS23 were then forced to merge to become the Irish Bank Resolution Corporation
(IBRC) following a July 1, 2011 order from the High Court requested by the Minister for
Finance (Central Bank of Ireland 2015). IBRC continued its business until February 7, 2013,
when the Irish government implemented the Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Act 2013.24
Under this act, IBRC entered special liquidation (Oireachtas Inquiry 2016; Oireachtas Inquiry
2016a). The government decided that NAMA would receive any commercial and residential
loans that “remained unsold after the special liquidators had completed a loan valuation and
sales process”. The Minister for Finance then facilitated this by ordering NAMA to use
National Asset Resolution Limited (NARL), NAMA’s newly created subsidiary, to extend a
loan to IBRC from the Central Bank of Ireland. This loan had been secured by a “floating
charge over certain IBRC assets.” NAMA paid for this facility by issuing €12.9 billion in
government guaranteed bonds via a subsidiary and subsequently supported this
arrangement by providing the Special Liquidator with a working capital lending facility.
However, by April 2014 the Special Liquidators announced that they were able to generate
enough revenue from their asset sales to pay its debt to NAMA; the Special Liquidators fully
repaid the debt on October 21, 2014 (NAMA Second Progress Report 2018).25 No IBRC assets
were ultimately transferred to NAMA.
At some point in this period, NAMA finished disposing of most of its non-Irish assets (See
Figure 10 and Figure 11). An audit report noted that “NAMA's principal focus from 2014 to
2020 will be in [the Republic of] Ireland, where it has projected that almost 60% of property
disposal receipts will arise” (NAMA Progress Report 2014). NAMA had accelerated its asset
disposal timeline, adjusting its “internal targets for cash generation and debt redemption”
accordingly (NAMA Second Progress Report 2018). During this process, NAMA packaged and
sold a number of its loans related to property outside of the Republic of Ireland, largely in
Both banks already been nationalized and were moving toward resolution (See Figure 8).
Which was signed by the President on February 7, 2013 (Oireachtas Inquiry 2016a)
25
NARL earned NAMA €164 million in profit during its operations
23
24
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Britain. One package associated with NAMA’s remaining loans in Northern Ireland that was
sold in 2014, Project Eagle, accounted for most of NAMA’s losses in 2014 (in which NAMA
itself made a loss) (C&AG 2016). Various political figures soon began to make allegations of
corruption related to Project Eagle, triggering parliamentary inquiries into NAMA’s strategy
as well as value achieved. The allegations also triggered criminal investigations of some of
the purchasers of NAMA assets (BBC 2015; Brennan 2018).
In spite of this, NAMA first became profitable (after impairment charges and taxes) in 2011,
broke even (in the aggregate) near the end of 2014, and started rapidly accumulating gains
through 2018 (NAMA Second Progress Report 2018).
Overall Outcomes
NAMA purchased 90% of the assets that it initially identified as eligible (over 12,000 loans
from 780 “debtor connections” ) between the beginning of its operations and March 2012
(NAMA Progress Report 2014; NAMA Section 227 Review 2014). These assets had a face
value of €74.4 billion, representing over 40% of Ireland’s GDP and 9.3% of Ireland’s banking
assets. The 10% of eligible assets that NAMA ultimately did not purchase had a face value of
around €9.2 billion (Cas and Peresa 2016; NAMA Progress Report 2014).26 For the eligible
assets that it did purchase, NAMA paid €31.8 billion in consideration to its five participating
banks (€30.2 billion in State-guaranteed senior bonds and €1.6 billion in subordinated
bonds) across two distinct tranches and one “bulk” tranche (Figure 6) resulting in realized
losses of €42.6 billion or 57% of the face value of the assets transferred, and motivating the
Irish government to shore up bank balance sheets with significant capital injections in 201011 (NAMA Progress Report 2014; Cussen and Lucey 2011).27 Although NAMA conducted
some asset sales as early as 2010, NAMA did not accelerate its asset sale operations until
2011. In 2011, the organization completed €3.6 billion in asset sales, began to report a yearly
profit, and redeemed €1.25 billion of its senior bonds (NAMA Annual Report 2012).
NAMA revised its policy on how many of its 780 borrowers would be managed directly
multiple times, increasing the number from 100 (NAMA Business Plan 2010) to somewhere
between 180 and 210 from 2010 until 2014 (NAMA Second Progress Report 2018; NAMA
Annual Report 2010; NAMA Annual Report 2011). In late 2015, NAMA decided to manage
all of its borrowers directly, after it conducted loan sales that “significantly reduced the
number of debtor connections” (NAMA Second Progress Report 2018). Alongside this
change, NAMA moved away from its policy of aggressively pursuing debtors through asset
searches and multi-jurisdictional court cases. For example, one journalist said that “The
government had promised that Nama would pursue debtors to “the ends of the earth.” This
NAMA’s decision for €2.6 billion of these was due to “a number of factors including the scale of debtors’
exposure to land and development relative to their total exposure” (Oireachtas Inquiry 2015). NAMA decided
not to acquire the other €6.6 billion because of a government decision to “not acquire loans from Allied Irish
Banks and Bank of Ireland where a borrower’s total exposure was less than €20 million” (NAMA Progress
Report 2014).
27
In 2010, the Irish government injected €25.3 billion into Anglo Irish Bank, €3.7 billion into AIB, €5.4 billion
into INBS, €0.875 billion into EBS; nationalized EBS as well as INBS; and restructured ANGLO and INBS (Cussen
and Lucey 2011).
26
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journalist later recalled that “in 2017 Michael Noonan, then finance minister, said that the
chance of the state recovering the full €74 billion owed on the loans was “lost in the financial
crisis” (O’Donoghue 2019).
NAMA also advanced €3.3 billion for capital expenditure in the land and development sector
from its establishment through 2018 (NAMA Annual Report 2018). On October 13, 2017,
NAMA redeemed the last of its senior debt and announced that it “expected to redeem €1.6
billion of subordinated debt by its first call date in March 2020” (End of Year Review 2018;
NAMA 2017). By the end of 2018, NAMA generated approximately €44 billion in funds from
its assets, had €2.3 billion in remaining assets, and was projecting that it would return over
€4 billion in profit to the taxpayers by the end of its life (Humphries 2019; NAMA Annual
Report 2018; End of Year Review 2018).
NAMA’s staff grew from just over 100 employees in 2010 to 370 by year-end 2014. By the
end of 2016, NAMA had approximately 300 employees, with a goal to further reduce staff in
connection with a wind-down strategy and redundancy scheme introduced by NAMA in
2015 (NAMA Second Progress Report 2018; NAMA Section 53 Statement for 2019 2018).
Even after NPLs were transferred to NAMA, Ireland’s NPLs as a percentage of gross loans in
the banking sector continued to increase. The NPL ratio peaked at 31.8% or €85.3 billion
only in Q4 2013, more than two years after loans were transferred to NAMA (Sibley 2017).
NAMA reckoned with competing mandates that became more visible as “an acute shortage
of [housing] supply […] occurred in many areas throughout the country” (NAMA 2015;
Kennedy, Gerard, and Stuart 2016). It began emphasizing its housing programs in 2016.
NAMA developed affordable housing on some of its property by matching residential stock
held by NAMA debtors and receivers with local social housing authorities . It also purchased
properties from NAMA debtors and receivers, then providing a long-term lease to the
relevant housing authorities (NAMA 2016). This emphasis accelerated in the following year.
Media stated that this was because NAMA had decided “the disposal of assets would be a less
prominent part of its activities in 2017 because of the progress it had made in reducing its
portfolio.” From this point, NAMA’s largest department was its “residential delivery unit” and
the organization committed to delivering 20,000 residential housing units by the end of 2020
(O’Dwyer 2016). By 2017, the Ireland’s Prime Minister was “examining the possibility of
repurposing Nama to develop lands on behalf of the state, to step in where the private sector
has failed” amid a “chronic shortage of homes and property prices again rising rapidly”
(Beesley 2017). Eventually, in early 2018, the Irish government established Home Building
Finance Ireland (HBFI), which would help finance the construction of new homes from a
$750 million Ministry of Finance fund. Staff seconded from NAMA would help the new
organization meet its administrative burdens (Bray 2018).
In December 2015, in response to NAMA’s pivot toward housing programs, five Irish
property developers lodged a complaint with the European Commission alleging that Ireland
has granted unlawful State aid to and through the operation of NAMA. The developers
alleged that the “alleged State guarantee and the alleged extraordinary post-acquisition
powers granted to NAMA, as well as the alleged tax exemptions of NAMA” constituted new
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and/or unlawful aid. They also asserted that “alleged aid to real estate developers […], access
to confidential information […], relationships of NAMA with local authorities and
government departments, and […] indirect acquisitions of land at steep discounts by NAMA”
constituted state aid under Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (TFEU). The European Commission responded with a January 25, 2018, ruling that the
measures addressed by the first set of allegations were “existing” and thus did “not constitute
new nor unlawful aid.” The ruling also rejected the developers’ arguments pertaining to
Article 107(1) of the TFEU (European Commission 2018).
However, this was not NAMA’s last interaction with the European Commission over state aid
issues. In late 2018 NAMA’s Board determined that it was “likely that the Agency will still
retain a small number of residual loans by the end of its expected end date of 2021.” This
was reportedly because the loans in question were either “subject to ongoing legal actions”
or were “secured by residential development sites that have the potential to deliver a
significant value uplift beyond 2021.”28 The Minister for Finance recommended that NAMA
continue its operations “for a limited period in order to manage out the residual loans so as
to optimise their value,” extending NAMA’s lifetime (Section 227 Review 2019). A formal
notification was sent to to the European Commission on June 20, 2019 that requested
NAMA’s lifespan be extended “beyond 2021 to the end of December 2025.” In its response,
the EC determined that it would not “raise objections to the new aid on the grounds that it is
compatible with the internal market pursuant to Article 107(3)(b)” of the TFEU. Ireland
attempted to assure the EC that NAMA would “continue not having a distortive effect on the
market” and thus proposed to make the following commitments regarding “its powers and
activities in the period beyond 2021” (European Commission 2019):
● NAMA would not alter or expand its mandate.
● NAMA would dispose of “its residual residential loans before the end of December
2025” and “be dissolved by that date subject to outstanding litigation.”
● Ireland would “not introduce any changes to the NAMA Act 2009 which requires
NAMA to act commercially and deal expeditiously with the remaining assets while
protecting or otherwise enhancing the value of those assets in the interests of the
State.”
● NAMA would “not provide new development funding for its remaining assets for the
period beyond end December 2021.”
● NAMA would “continue to act as a Market Economy Operator with regard to the
management and disposal of its post-2021 residual portfolio.”’
● Ireland would “continue to submit yearly reports on the use of certain powers under
the NAMA Act 2009 to the EU Commission and the Competition and Consumer
Protection Commission, as provided for in paragraph 74(vii) of the 2010 Decision.”

28

NAMA’s assets related to the various housing programs would have conceivably been in the latter category.
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● Ireland “would submit an annual report to the EU Commission providing an update
on the progress that NAMA has made towards deleveraging its residual portfolio […]
every year from 2021 until NAMA’s dissolution.”
● NAMA and Ireland would not “issue any additional State guaranteed NAMA bonds”
(European Commission 2019,).
● On July 26, 2019, the Minister for Finance stated that NAMA can remain operating
through 2025, extending it from 2021 as previously projected (O'Halloran 2019)
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II. . Key Design Decisions
1. Part of a Package: NAMA was coordinated with several rounds of capital injections
and stress tests, but was not announced alongside these activities.
The announcement and creation of NAMA in 2009 did not initially appear to be coordinated
with other programs. By the time that NAMA was established, the government had
nationalized ANGLO and also injected capital into ANGLO, AIB, and BOI (Cussen and Lucey
2011) (See Figure 8).
However, the Central Bank of Ireland knew that its March 2010 stress test would reveal
significant losses. The stress test, known as the Prudential Capital Assessment Review
(PCAR), projected the capital each bank would need by the end of 2012 to meet regulatory
capital requirements (Honohan 2015; Honohan 2012; Honohan 2010; NAMA Frequently
Asked Questions 2009, 10-11). This would theoretically make transparent to the public the
size of banks’ losses. Based on the haircuts, the banks would raise more capital (via
government capital injections or via the private sector).
However, the haircuts that came with NAMA’s asset valuations and purchases were larger
than those projected by the stress tests, creating further uncertainty (Honohan 2015;
Honohan 2012; Honohan 2010; NAMA Frequently Asked Questions 2009). NAMA was
originally expected to cement confidence in the stress test projections and create market
certainty as to the health of Ireland’s banks. These larger than expected haircuts did the
opposite. Responding to the larger-than-expected haircuts problem, policymakers in 2010
injected at least €23 billion into Anglo Irish Bank, €0.35 billion into EBS, €2.3 billion into
INBS, and €3.7 billion into Allied Irish Banks (See Figure 8). They hoped that the new capital
could fill the larger-than-expected capital holes exposed by NAMA (Cussen and Lucey 2011,
83). The government had enough money on hand to fill the holes projected by the stress
tests, but not the larger-than-expected ones exposed by NAMA. Therefore, the government
had to seek a program from the troika (Honohan 2019).
It is also important to note that these capital injections were not required for these domestic
banks to participate in NAMA. Nor was participation in NAMA required for banks to be
recapitalized (National Asset Management Agency Act 2009, Revised 2018). However,
recapitalization was certainly mandatory for the participating banks because of their
performance in the stress tests (Honohan 2015; Honohan 2012; Honohan 2010; NAMA
Frequently Asked Questions 2009). For foreign-owned banks in Ireland, the government
requested that they be recapitalized using funds from their parent companies before
requesting funding from the government for recapitalization (Cerruti and Neyens 2016).
That being said, none of the foreign-owned banks in Ireland requested government funding
or applied to NAMA.
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Figure 8: Major Irish Government Actions in the Banking Sector (2008-2010)
Pre-Establishment of NAMA

Within a year of the establishment of NAMA

Date

Action

Date

Action

2008-09-30

€352 billion blanket guarantee

2010-03-31

INBS capital
million)

injection

(€100

INBS capital injection (€2.6 billion)
Nationalization of INBS
2010-05-28

Effective nationalization of EBS
EBS capital injection (€100 million)

2009-01-15

Nationalization of ANGLO

2010-05-31

ANGLO capital injection (€8.3
billion in capital and €2 billion in
contingent capital)

2010-06-00

EBS capital injection (€250 million)

Restructuring (eventual merger) of
ANGLO and INBS

2009-02-11

2010-08-00

ANGLO capital injection (€8.58
billion)

BOI capital injection (€3.5 billion)
AIB capital injection (€3.5 billion)

2009-06-29

ANGLO
billion)

capital

injection

(€3.0

2009-08-06

ANGLO
billion)

capital

injection

(€0.8

2010-12-23

AIB capital injection (€3.7 billion)

2009-09-25

ANGLO
billion)

capital

injection

(€0.2

2010-12-00

ANGLO capital injection (€1.474
billion)
ANGLO capital injection (€4.946
billion)

Source: Cussen and Lucey 2011; Central Bank of Ireland, 2011; Department of Finance 2009; Honohan
2012; Homar 2016; Palcic and Reeves 2011.
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2. Legal Authority: The Republic of Ireland gave NAMA extensive legal authority using
the NAMA Act.
After the April 7, 2009, announcement of NAMA, the government drafted the NAMA Act to
grant NAMA any authority “necessary for, or incidental to, the achievement of its purposes
and the performance of its functions.” The government introduced a draft version of the
NAMA Bill on July 30, 2009, which was revised and eventually became the NAMA Act when
the Taoiseach (Ireland’s prime minister) signed it into law on November 22, 2009, in spite
of substantial public opposition (National Asset Management Agency Act 2009).
3. Legal Authority: The Republic of Ireland structured the NAMA Act to comply with
European Commission rules and obtained approval for NAMA’s operations at
multiple points.
The NAMA Act had to comply with European state aid rules (Cahill and O’Donnell 2010).
NAMA would constitute state aid. Therefore, NAMA could only be compatible with the EU’s
internal market if it met the criteria for EC state aid rules for asset relief measures. These
criteria were established in the Communication from the Commission on the Treatment of
Impaired Assets in the Community Banking Sector of February 25, 2009 (better known as the
Impaired Asset Communication and the IAC) (Communication from the Commission 2009;
Cas and Peresa 2016).
These criteria pertained to the following aspects of the program:
● “Transparency and disclosure requirements;”
● “burden sharing between the State, shareholders and creditors;”
● “aligning incentives for beneficiaries with public policy objectives;”
● “principles for designing asset-relief measures in terms of eligibility, valuation and
management of impaired assets;” and
● “the relationship between asset relief, other government support measures and the
restructuring of banks” (Communication from the Commission 2009).
The EC found NAMA to be consistent with State aid criteria. The EC approved the
establishment of NAMA on February 26, 2010. It then required NAMA to submit each of
NAMA’s asset transfers (and the corresponding valuation) to the EC for review (Cas and
Peresa 2016; Martin 2010).
4. Special Powers: NAMA possessed numerous powers and immunities in Ireland’s
legal system, but the European Commission significantly restricted their use.
NAMA was seen as having a broad legal mandate (Cas and Peresa 2016). The Minister for
Finance also buttressed NAMA’s authority with a bevy of statutory amendments between
2009 and 2013 (NAMA Amendments 2019). As a result, NAMA was protected from a variety
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of types of liability and had special rights during legal proceedings, reflecting policymakers’
concern that “litigation might hinder the achievement of NAMA’s objectives” (Carroll and
Dodd 2012; National Asset Management Agency Act 2009, Revised 2018)
These rights and protections included, but were not limited to the following examples:
● If an asset acquired by NAMA were secured by a charge, then NAMA could redeem or
discharge any charges on an acquired asset that were senior to NAMA’s, rendering
NAMA the senior creditor (National Asset Management Agency Act 2009, Revised
2018);
● NAMA could void certain transactions that “hinder the acquisition or impair the value
of an eligible bank asset”;
● For certain claims, the NAMA Act restricted the remedies available for damages and
also restricted the power of the courts to “grant injunctive relief”;
● NAMA could join certain legal proceedings “in lieu of or in addition to” the
participating banks (Carroll and Dodd 2012).
NAMA also had the power to issue directions to participating institutions to deal with any
unacquired portion of an asset that NAMA had acquired from said institution in any way
specified by NAMA. Participating institutions were required to obey these directions and
“dealing with” could mean the participant giving NAMA title to an asset in situations where
NAMA acquired a derivative that captured the proceeds of said asset (National Asset
Management Agency Act 2009, Revised 2018).
NAMA had the power to access information on its borrowers from tax authorities as well as
any necessary information on its acquired assets from the government’s Land Registry
(National Asset Management Agency Act 2009, Revised 2018; Cerruti and Neyens 2016). The
NAMA Act provided NAMA with the “compulsory right of purchase”, the right to petition the
Court for vesting orders, and the ability to appoint a statutory receiver to a participant’s
assets (Cerruti and Neyens 2016). All three of these powers allowed NAMA to increase its
control over the relevant asset (and potentially its underlying property) (Property
Registration Authority 2014). The first two of these powers aimed to help NAMA in its effort
to avoid fire sales. The compulsory right of purchase was similar to the eminent domain
powers enjoyed by authorities in the United States; it made it less costly in time and money
to acquire distressed assets. The vesting order right made it possible for NAMA to convert
its security interest in underlying collateral into outright ownership (Carroll and Dodd 2012;
McNulty 1912). As part of EC state aid proceedings, Ireland committed to consult with the
EC before using its “compulsory right of purchase” power; however, it did not need to consult
with the EC in situations involving ransom strips of land—that is, land needed to access an
adjacent property from a public highway (Martin 2010). The EC also required the Irish
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authorities to commit that NAMA wouldn’t use its vesting order power in the context of a
syndicated loan without the agreement of the other syndicate members.29
The power to appoint a statutory receiver allowed NAMA to appoint a receiver to take
possession of the collateral securing its assets; this was an unprecedented power within Irish
creditor-debtor law. This power became NAMA’s favored tool for pursuing uncooperative
debtors (Carroll and Dodd 2012). According to NAMA officials, NAMA needed this power
because Irish insolvency law at the time was extremely outdated; bankruptcy under existing
laws could take as long as 12 years. Legislators were already debating bankruptcy reforms
that included features like the power to appoint a statutory receiver. While these reforms
would not happen until 2012, some of the features made their way into the NAMA Act 2009
(Susan McDermott and Jamie Bourke of NAMA, Zoom discussion with author, February 26,
2021).
5. Mandate: NAMA technically had numerous mandates outlined under the NAMA Act,
but the primary one was achieving the best financial return for the government
NAMA’s initial mandate was to realize the aims of the NAMA Act by acquiring eligible bank
assets from participating institutions, “as is appropriate,” dealing with such acquired assets
“expeditiously,” and enhancing or protecting the value of the assets in the interest of the
government (gov.ie 2019). To this end, NAMA’s commercial mandate was to obtain the best
achievable financial return for the government, taking the three following parameters into
account: (1) The amount of money the Irish government paid to acquire and manage the
assets, (2) NAMA’s cost of capital and operating costs, and (3) any other factor that NAMA
thinks is relevant to realizing its purpose (National Asset Management Agency Act 2009,
Revised 2018).
NAMA’s mandate did evolve over time. As Ireland’s economic health deteriorated in the
second half of 2010, NAMA began to emphasize its role in the restructuring of the banking
system (NAMA Second Progress Report 2018). After NAMA’s asset disposals then
accelerated and its portfolio shrank, NAMA’s mandate gradually shifted to one focused on
the development of affordable housing in Ireland (Dodd 2012; O’Dwyer 2016; NAMA
Progress Report 2014). This related to one of the aims of the NAMA Act, which was to
“contribute to the social and economic development of the state” (Susan McDermott and
Jamie Bourke of NAMA, Zoom discussion with author, February 26, 2021).
6. Communication: NAMA had a public relations strategy and message but faced
limitations in its efforts to be perceived by the public as transparent.
NAMA officials appeared on radio programs to explain the organization’s activities and
supplied anonymous as well as official information to newspapers (Carswell 2010; Irish
Independent 2012).30 NAMA did not have a constituency in the banking or property
The EC asked Ireland to restrict NAMA’s use of several other powers that it understood to be “potentially
more distortive” of competition (Martin 2010).
30
NAMA officials were bound by a Code of Conduct and by the Official Secrets Act 1963 that kept them from
providing confidential information through external sources (NAMA Annual Report 2010).
29
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development industry, with its Chairman stating in the 2010 Annual Report that “I do not
believe that any other State Agency has come into being with a potential client base—those
in banking and property development—whose enthusiasm for it was so lukewarm” (NAMA
Annual Report 2010).
According to NAMA officials, the organization’s messaging evolved as the institution’s work
evolved. When NAMA was first proposed, the Irish government did not promote NAMA as a
guaranteed cure for the economy’s woes and very much presented the NAMA scheme as a
work in progress. Government officials communicated that the potentially large (and
uncertain) cost of NAMA’s purchases and the make-up of Ireland’s sovereign bond holders
could have negative impact on Ireland’s fiscal situation. However, it seemed to hedge those
concerns by stating that “The income streams from the NAMA assets will mitigate the cost to
the Exchequer of servicing the additional debt and the proceeds from their eventual sale will
accrue to NAMA and the Exchequer (Houses of the Oireachtas May 2009).”
Several other key themes echoed throughout NAMA’s communications. One was that NAMA
was not a bailout for developers or a bad bank. Government statements referred to NAMA as
an “asset management agency” rather than as a “bad bank,” with the Taoiseach claiming that
NAMA “is not a bad bank model […] because it obviously takes in all loans, including
performing loans.” The word “bailout” only seemed to appear when NAMA was being
discussed in the Oireachtas or in simplified NAMA documents (which may have been aimed
at the general public) like the three-page “The National Asset Management Agency: A Brief
Guide” (NAMA Brief Guide 2010; Houses of the Oireachtas May 2009a).
From 2013, as NAMA’s asset sales accelerated, messaging shifted toward emphasizing the
organization’s ability to meet its strategic objectives (Susan McDermott and Jamie Bourke of
NAMA, Zoom discussion with author, February 26, 2021). Around this time, NAMA started
talking more about its social and economic contributions. NAMA’s focus on its social and
economic contributions became more dominant as the organization took on more of a role
as a housing developer in the mid-to-late 2010s (Dodd 2012; O’Dwyer 2016).
Although NAMA publicly emphasized its commitment to transparency early on in its life,
references to transparency (beyond transparency in its procurement process) in official
communications were less common in annual reports released after 2010 (NAMA Annual
Report 2010; NAMA Annual Report 2012; NAMA Annual Report 2013; NAMA Annual Report
2018). That being said, NAMA states that it has been fully transparent within the constraints
put on it by Irish laws and confidentiality rules (Susan McDermott and Jamie Bourke of
NAMA, Zoom discussion with author, February 26, 2021).
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Another theme in NAMA’s communications is best expressed by the statement “NAMA is not
the problem, it is merely cleaning up a problem that was created by others.” Officials tended
to describe what NAMA would do using nonfinancial terms like “cleansing” and
“crystallising” losses. NAMA would act in a commercial manner, but would not hesitate to
put pressure on the banks and borrowers. For example, NAMA asserted that it would only
be providing funding to developers “where it will make commercial sense” and criticized the
banks by stating that NAMA’s operations had “revealed a troubling picture of poor loan
documentation, of assets not properly legally secured and of inadequate stress-testing of
borrowers and loans—all born of a mindless scramble to funnel lending into one sector at
considerable pace and of a reckless abandonment of basic principles of credit risk and
prudent lending” (McDonagh 2010).
7. Ownership Structure: The government of Ireland created NAMA as a majority
private-owned entity because of concerns about placing additional contingent
liabilities on the government balance sheet.
If NAMA’s assets ended up on the government’s balance sheet some policymakers believed
that there would be an increased possibility that “Irish […] [deficit] levels could be artificially
distorted as a result of loan foreclosures” on loans with collateral located in Ireland. Eurostat
regulations mandated that NAMA’s assets needed to have majority private ownership to not
be on the government balance sheet and enjoy a government guarantee at the same time
(Cussen and Lucey 2011).
To fulfill this requirement, NAMA conducted most of its operations through an Irish SPV
created by NAMA called National Asset Management Agency Investment Ltd. (Called
NAMAIL or the Invest Co.). Invest Co. was a public-private partnership with initial capital of
€100 million. Three sets of private investors (Irish Life & Permanent, New Ireland Assurance
(Bank of Ireland Group), and “a group of clients of Allied Irish Banks’ Investment Managers”)
held a 51% stake and NAMA held a 49% stake with veto power over strategic decisions
(Martin 2010; Cas and Peresa 2016). Beneath this SPV were three Section 110 SPVs, which
enjoyed special tax status (allowing for only a nominal tax burden), and two conventional
Irish SPVs (See Figure 4) (NAMA Acquisition of Bank Assets 2010; NAMA Second Progress
Report 2018). NAMA wanted to reduce the tax liability of its subsidiaries because NAMA’s
exemption from “income tax, corporation tax and capital gains tax” under Section 214 of the
NAMA Act did not apply to subsidiaries.31 Although the NAMA Act did not allow NAMA itself
to downstream its own tax-exempt status to its subsidiaries, Irish corporate law, with its
treatment of Section 110 SPVs, allowed NAMA to decrease its tax burden in line with other
Irish corporations of the time.
Invest Co. created (and owned a 100% stake in) a Section 110 SPV called National Asset
Management Ltd. (also known as the Master SPV). The Master SPV then owned a subsidiary
Section 110 SPV called National Asset Management Group Services Ltd. (the Intermediate
Co.). The Intermediate Co. owned three functional subsidiaries: a Section 110 SPV known as
Such maneuvers were common in Irish finance at the time, though this would change with legal reforms in
2016.
31
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National Asset Loan Management Ltd. (the Acquirer Co.), a conventional Irish SPV known as
National Asset Property Management Ltd. (the Property Co.), and a conventional Irish SPV
known as National Asset Management Services Ltd. (the Management Services Co.) (NAMA
Acquisition of Bank Assets 2010).
Together, the companies functioned as follows: The Acquirer Co. directly received the assets
that NAMA bought, which included any income from interest on the loans, and initiated
enforcement proceedings against the borrowers of the loans as needed. As the Acquirer Co.
could not “carry on any activities ancillary to holding and managing the loans,” it sold the
properties it acquired to the Property Co. for zero consideration upfront. The Property Co.
then managed these properties and used its property management profits to pay corporation
taxes. The Property Co. would eventually dispose of the assets and pay the resulting proceeds
to the Acquirer Co. as delayed consideration. The Acquirer Co.’s after tax proceeds then
flowed back up through the other SPVs to the Master SPV, which paid a performance-based
dividend to Invest Co.’s private investors and then paid any remaining surplus to NAMA.
Finally, NAMA paid the surplus it received from the Master SPV to the Exchequer (NAMA
Acquisition of Bank Assets 2010).
In order to limit the benefits and potential losses for NAMA’s private-sector shareholders,
NAMA placed a cap on their possible annual return or loss to 10% above or below the yield
on the 10-year Irish government bond yield, with remaining profits (losses) going to NAMA
(Braakman and Forster 2011).
Meanwhile, the Management Services Co. handled the expenses, tax administration, and
financial operations of these companies (Carroll and Dodd 2012).
This private ownership legal structure was based on a French program called Socié té de
Financement de l’É conomie Française (SFEF). SFEF used a majority privately owned vehicle
to issue government guaranteed debts and lend the proceeds to French financial institutions
in need of liquidity. NAMA chose to follow this structure, because it initially fit well with
Eurostat accounting guidelines. These guidelines allowed majority-private interventions like
SFEF and NAMA to avoid being counted as part of the public debt (Cussen and Lucey 2011).
The Eurostat regulation also required that NAMAIL be “of a temporary duration,” “created
solely to deal with the financial crisis,” and not be “expected to incur losses” (Cussen and
Lucey 2011). By 2016, these Eurostat rules changed, placing asset management companies
like NAMA on the government balance sheet if the company’s funding structure had a
government guarantee, even if the AMC were privately owned (Cas and Peresa 2016).
However, it is not clear how much a difference the changed Eurostat rules would have made
to NAMA’s operations. Ratings companies classified NAMA as part of the Irish sovereign’s
balance sheet and the Irish government had to enter an EC-IMF program at the end of 2010
regardless (European Commission 2019a; Cullinan and Beers 2010).
NAMA’s SPV structure and use of profit participation loan (PPL) agreements initially also
allowed NAMA to pay almost no taxes. Under such agreements, the Section 110 SPVs would
pay interest on the PPLs dependent on its profitability. However, due to a number of changes
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in the tax law in 2016, NAMA restructured the Acquirer Co. into a “regular trading company”
when the PPL tax deduction was restricted (NAMA Second Progress Report 2018).
8. Governance/Administration: NAMA was structured as a corporation but had
several features (beyond the government’s control of its board) meant to protect
the interests of the state and draw on existing resources within the Irish
government.
NAMA was structured as a statutory corporation (not a bank) and was governed using a nineperson Board. The composition of NAMA’s Board was as follows:
● Seven members appointed by the Minister for Finance
● Two ex-officio members appointed by the Minister for Finance
o The CEO of NAMA (appointed by the Minister for Finance in consultation with
the Chief Executive of the NTMA)
o The Chief Executive of the NTMA (National Asset Management Agency Act
2009, Revised 2018)
Additionally, NAMA was subject to various anti-corruption acts and a number of other anticorruption related provisions. The NAMA Act made lobbying NAMA, defined broadly, a legal
offence (Carroll and Dodd 2012; National Asset Management Agency Act 2009, Revised
2018). This provision also penalized people who believed that they received a
communication that constituted lobbying under the NAMA Act, but did not report the details
of the communication to the Garda (police) promptly. The NAMA Act also contained
provisions that appeared to protect whistle-blowers (National Asset Management Agency
Act 2009, Revised 2018).
NAMA was provided with staff, “human resources, IT and market risk analysis” services32 by
its parent, the National Treasury Management Agency (NTMA) (Cas and Peresa 2016).33
NAMA expected to have around 100 employees (Connolly 2017, 1-2), but grew to a size of
up to 380 employees with specialist skills in property, banking, finance, law, and related
disciplines (Williams 2014). This number does not include the roughly 500 people at the five
participating banks who managed NAMA’s €13 billion exposure to smaller debtors (About
NAMA 2014). For staff and contractors involved in asset management, NAMA drew on “many
former development companies and former banking interests” (Williams 2014). Until
around 2014, NAMA’s staff enjoyed bonuses linked to employee performance (Cerruti and
Over time, NAMA developed an extensive IT interface that included a public database of “NAMA-related
properties in receivership in Ireland, Northern Ireland and Great Britain.” (See NAMA Annual Report 2018).
33
NTMA was “reimbursed by NAMA for the costs of these services.” (See Cas and Peresa 2016). Although the
NTMA was the organization in charge of issuing and managing Irish government debt, it was not formally part
of the Ministry of Finance. (See Linehan 2012). As a result, NTMA did not have to be staffed by civil servants
(although its chief was to be appointed by the Minister for Finance) and could pay its employees a salary that
was similar to those in the private sector while cutting down the amount of bureaucracy required for decisionmaking (as well as hiring). The NTMA was also the institution in charge of managing the national pension fund.
32
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Neyens 2016). A change in this policy, and NAMA’s March 2012 reorganization from asset
purchase and valuation to asset management, caused NAMA to lose critical staff (NAMA
Annual Report 2012). Anticipating NAMA’s eventual winding-down, NAMA implemented a
voluntary redundancy program in 2015, which NAMA’s Chief Executive described as “helpful
to date in stemming the volume of staff departures at a time when an uncontrolled exodus
would have been seriously damaging to our business.” Nevertheless, NAMA did not appear
to have remedies for retaining “specialist staff,” which NAMA believed could be easily
poached by the recovering private sector (NAMA Annual Report 2015).
Discussions with NAMA staff revealed that though NAMA could pay market rates, its
positions were largely for contractors (Susan McDermott and Jamie Bourke of NAMA, Zoom
discussion with author, February 26, 2021). As an organization with a limited lifetime,
employees could not be certain that these contracts would always be renewed. Therefore,
some employees started to leave as the market improved, reasoning that NAMA could not
offer enough job security.
Figure 9: Administration Expenses and Employee Numbers

Source: Ministry of Finance Section 227 review of NAMA, 2019.

9. Governance/Administration: NAMA was formally subject to extensive oversight by
multiple stakeholders.
NAMA had significant accountability to the Minister for Finance, the Oireachtas, and the EC.
As for the two former groups, NAMA had to do several things. It had to submit annual reports
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to the Minister for Finance, keep accounts in a form specified by the Minister for Finance,
and produce quarterly reports for the Minister for Finance (that would then be passed on to
the Oireachtas). It also had to produce reports at the behest of the Minister for Finance,
submit to audit by the Comptroller and Auditor General, and be accountable to the legislative
Dail Eireann Committee of Public Accounts (PAC) (Carroll and Dodd 2012). NAMA’s
Chairperson and CEO were required to report to other committees in the Oireachtas that had
been appointed to “examine matters related to NAMA” (National Asset Management Agency
Act 2009, Revised 2018). Although NAMA was required to “act in a transparent manner in
carrying out its functions,” it only had to do so to the extent that it was “consistent with
proper and efficient and effective discharge” of its functions (Carroll and Dodd 2012). As for
the EC, NAMA had to report to the EC every six months on its participating banks’
restructuring plans and the functioning of the program. NAMA also had to report to EC’s and
the Republic of Ireland’s competition authorities each year on the “use of NAMA’s post
acquisition powers” (Martin 2010).
Operationally, NAMA enjoyed a significant amount of independence because the Minister for
Finance only appeared to intervene in NAMA on a limited basis (Carroll and Dodd 2012).34
However, the Minister for Finance was able to control NAMA using several tools. Under the
NAMA Act, the Minister for Finance could issue binding written guidelines and directions to
NAMA. NAMA would have to “have regard to any guidelines issued by” the Minister for
Finance and be required to comply with written directions from the Minister for Finance
“concerning the achievement of the purposes of this Act” (National Asset Management
Agency Act 2009, Revised 2018). The Minister could also determine which organizations
could participate in NAMA, which assets would count as eligible assets, and have the final
say over whether a “particular asset may be acquired.” They also had the final say on the
“total value of a portfolio of assets to be acquired from a participating institution” in cases
where the participants filed a dispute with NAMA (Carroll and Dodd 2012). The structure of
NAMA’s Board, in which seven of its nine members and NAMA’s CEO were appointed by the
Minister for Finance, also granted the Minister for Finance a significant amount of power
over the organization (National Asset Management Agency Act 2009, Revised 2018).
In practice, as of 2019, the Minister for Finance issued six directions and twelve statutory
instruments under the NAMA Act (National Asset Management Agency Act 2009, Revised
2018). The Minister for Finance also issued four directions under the IBRC Act in 2013
(Carroll and Dodd 2012).
There were only three events where the Minister for Finance used its powers to issue
directions and statutory instruments under the NAMA Act to become visibly involved in
NAMA’s day-to-day operations. The first was when the Minister for Finance put forward two
statutory instruments and a direction requiring NAMA to expedite its asset acquisition
process (eliminating the tranche system) (Lenihan 2010; S.I. No. 504 2010; S.I. No. 505
2010). The others were two operations related to the IBRC; one of the directions under the
However, University College Dublin economist Karl Whelan argued that the Minister for Finance strained
NAMA’s independence when he ordered that NAMA acquire a loan facility between IBRC and the Central Bank
of Ireland. This order aimed to limit the damage of IBRC’s special liquidation in April 2012 (See NAMA Second
Progress Report 2018). (See Whelan 2012).
34
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NAMA Act and all four directions under the IBRC Act ordered NAMA to support the special
liquidation of IBRC in various capacities (Legislation).
10. Size: NAMA did not have a specified size and funded itself, but its size was limited
by a €54 billion cap on debt securities it could use to purchase assets and a €5
billion cap on borrowings for other purposes.
There was no cap on the face value of the assets NAMA would purchase, but the NAMA Act
allowed the organization to issue up to €54 billion in debt securities for the purchase of
assets before asking the government for permission to spend additional funds (Carroll and
Dodd 2012). This number was arrived at by estimating the long-term value of the assets
expected to be eligible for transfer to NAMA. €47 billion of this figure represented the thencurrent market value of the assets. They determined the remaining €7 billion by applying a
number of statutory uplift factors (related to the expected default rate, the proportion of
performing loans, etc.) (NAMA Business Plan 2009).
Ultimately, NAMA spent €31.8 billion to acquire assets with a face value of €74.4 billion.
11. Funding Source: NAMA was mostly government-funded, using governmentguaranteed debt and loans from the Irish government.
NAMA ultimately funded its asset purchases by issuing €30.2 billion in state-guaranteed
senior bonds usable as collateral in the Eurosystem and €1.6 billion in subordinated bonds.
Minister for Finance Brian Lenihan said that the purpose of these subordinated bonds was
that they “put […] the bank at risk if NAMA were to lose money […] without giving them an
upside in relation to its gains” (Houses of the Oireachtas September 2009).
The terms of the senior bonds included (but were not limited to) the following (NAMA
2011)35:
● Principal and Interest guaranteed by The Minister for Finance of Ireland
● Maximum Amount Outstanding: €51,300,000,000
● Currency: Euro, Sterling, or U.S. Dollars
● Issue Date: March 26, 2010 (Carroll and Dodd 2012)
● Maturity: March 1, 2011 (it is uncertain whether all the senior debt would be rolled
over annually)
● Interest Rate (paid semi-annually on March 1 and September 1):
This information is from the March 1, 2011, circular, but the 2011 issuance was in substantially the same
form as the 2010 issuance (with exception of the fact that the 2011 issuance “may be physically settled at
maturity at the option of the Issuer upon not less than 20 business days’ notice to holders by issuing a new Note
on the same terms as the existing Note,” while the 2010 issuance could be “physically settled at maturity at the
option of the Issuer upon not less than 10 business days’ notice. (See NAMA 2011.)
35
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o For Euro-denominated Notes: six-month Euribor
o For Dollar-denominated Notes: six-month LIBOR
o For Sterling-denominated Notes: six-month LIBOR (NAMA 2011)
The architects of the senior bonds appear not to have anticipated that the six-month Euribor
rate might decrease to the extent that the bonds bore a negative interest rate. If the notes
carried a negative interest rate, they could not be used as collateral with the ECB and this
would therefore make it more difficult for their holders to fulfill “their regulatory liquidity
requirements.”36 When the six-month Euribor rate declined to 4.9 basis points in late July
2015, the Minister for Finance began to worry that a negative interest rate was a significant
possibility. In response, the Minister directed NAMA to “take appropriate steps to ensure
that in the event that the 6[-]month Euribor is negative a negative rate will not apply to the
Notes.” He continued, writing that NAMA was “to ensure that these notes remain eligible as
collateral for Eurosystem monetary policy operations” in so far as was possible (Noonan
2015).
The terms of the subordinated bonds included (but were not limited to) the following (NAMA
2010):
● Aggregate Nominal Amount and Issue Price: 5% of the total acquisition value of the
acquired portfolio of each participating institution (€1.6 billion)
● Currency: Euro
● Issue Date: March 26, 2010
● Interest Rate: 10-year Irish Government bonds rate as of March 26, 2010 (the first
issue date), plus 75 basis points, paid annually starting March 1, 2011, if the Board of
the Issuer determines the Issuer is “achieving objectives” related to NAMA’s financial
performance37(Carroll and Dodd 2012; NAMA Annual Report 2018).
● First Call Date: March 1, 2020
● Term: Perpetual

That being said, negative rates were not a common occurrence, let alone perceived as a likely occurrence
when these senior bonds were designed (Liu and Anderson 2013).
37
Until NAMA achieved these objectives, the subordinated bonds would serve as a loss-bearing liability held
by participants.
36
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NAMA funded its day-to-day operations through government borrowing and €51 million in
equity provided by the various private organizations investing in NAMA’s SPV (Martin 2010;
Cas and Peresa 2016). In practice, NAMA was able to sustain itself using funds generated by
its operations after it repaid €299 million in loans from the Central Fund by February 2011
(NAMA Annual Report 2011; McDonagh 2013). NAMA originally expected to issue
commercial paper, but this proved difficult amidst Ireland’s deteriorating financial
conditions (Martin 2010; Cas and Peresa 2016).
12. Funding Source: NAMA possessed a clawback feature that enabled it to tax
participants to cover any aggregate losses it ultimately suffered.
NAMA enjoyed a loss-sharing clawback provision under the NAMA Act. Under this provision,
if NAMA ended up with a loss, NAMA could impose a tax on its participants to make up the
loss. The EC pointed to this tool as one of NAMA’s two “risk-sharing-mechanisms.” However,
the feature was controversial during NAMA’s design (Martin 2010). NAMA’s (preestablishment) interim CEO Brendan McDonagh and the future Minister for Finance Brian
Lenihan argued against the measure during debates on Peter Bacon’s initial NAMA proposal.
According to them, “the appropriate place to impose the levy would be finance legislation
rather than the NAMA legislation [because] it might have an effect on the valuation of the
assets to be transferred” as the clawback essentially represented “an unpriced option in
terms of what the clawback would be in the future” (Houses of the Oireachtas May 2009b).
Although similar loss-sharing features might have been controversial when put forward in
other countries, legislators adopted the provision in response to “voters’ anger over the
rising cost of the bank bailout and simultaneous fiscal tightening,” and the provision ceased
to be particularly newsworthy soon after (Gumuchian 2010).
13. Eligible Institutions: Any credit institution could apply to NAMA, but the Minister
would ultimately decide which applicants were eligible.
Once NAMA was established (on December 21, 2009) “[a]ny credit institution, including Irish
subsidiaries of foreign credit institutions,” that wished to participate had 60 days (until
February 19, 2010) to apply. All five applicants were Irish banks and their subsidiaries that
were covered by the Irish government’s blanket guarantee (Martin 2010). NAMA started
collecting information from some of these banks in mid-2009, as there were already public
expectations that certain troubled banks (like ANGLO) would apply (NAMA Acquisition of
Bank Assets 2010).
Before NAMA began, the government requested that foreign banks subsidiaries in Ireland be
recapitalized using funds from their parent companies before requesting funding from the
government; however, this became a moot point because no foreign bank subsidiaries
applied to participate in NAMA and a similar requirement did not exist for the other domestic
banks (Cerruti and Neyens 2016).
Within three months of receiving an application, the Minister, after consultation with the
Governor of the Central Bank and Regulatory Authority, would determine if an applicant
could participate based on three factors (Martin 2010; National Asset Management Agency
Act 2009, Revised 2018):

585

National Asset Management Agency

Nye

● Systemic importance of the applicant, which was determined using a standardized
rubric (Martin 2010, 37; NAMA Acquisition of Bank Assets 2010);
● Available Ministry of Finance resources and the financial position of the applicant;
● Compliance with NAMA Act obligations, which included but what were not limited
to:
● Including all of its subsidiaries in its application to the Minister for Finance;
● Providing any “information, explanation, books, documents and records
that the Minister” required;
● Certifying in “utmost good faith […] all matters and circumstances […] that
might materially affect […] the Minister’s decision” on an institution’s
application; and
● Limiting a number of business actions (like dealing with eligible assets
outside the ordinary course of business) it could take without “prior
written approval of NAMA” before NAMA acquired the eligible assets
(National Asset Management Agency Act 2009, Revised 2018).
Although the initial proposals for an asset management company had recommended that the
program be mandatory, the government opted for a voluntary approach (National Asset
Management Agency Act 2009, Revised 2018). This was because the various recapitalization
undertaken by the government had already resulted in significant public ownership of the
Irish banking system. The government had stakes in ANGLO, AIB, and BOI at the time of
NAMA’s establishment (Cerruti and Neyens 2016).
14. Other Conditions: The NAMA Act could allow the Irish government to exercise
significant control over participating institutions.
Ireland’s Financial Regulator and the Minister for Finance could require participants to
produce any such report they considered necessary for monitoring compliance. After
consultations with the Governor of the Central Bank and the Financial Regulator, the
Minister for Finance could require participants to produce Restructuring Plans and/or
business plans by a certain time. With approval from the Minister for Finance, the Financial
Regulator could also issue directions to participants that would restrict balance sheet
growth, the ability of participants to conduct mergers or acquisitions, or require balance
sheet reduction, so long as the purpose of the direction was to achieve the purposes of the
NAMA Act (National Asset Management Agency Act 2009, Revised 2018).
It is important to understand that the Irish government already had significant control over
the country’s large banks by the time that NAMA began operating. The government had
significant stakes in all of NAMA’s participants by the end of 2010 (See Figure 8) (Palcic and
Reeves 2011).
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15. Eligible Assets: The original act defined eligible assets broadly, but the Minister of
Finance limited the program to loans and contracts related to development of land
(Cas and Peresa 2016).
Any “bank asset” designated by the Minister for Finance was an eligible asset for purchase
by NAMA. In the NAMA Act, the term could broadly include any “security related to a credit
facility” as well as any credit facility. But the Minister for Finance ultimately defined eligible
bank assets more narrowly as “all loans issued for the purchase, exploitation or development
of land as well as loans either secured or guaranteed by land;” related commercial loans; and
other financial contracts relating to acquired loans (Martin 2010; NAMA Acquisition of Bank
Assets 2010; Oireachtas Inquiry 2016). NAMA had full discretion to decide which assets it
would purchase from participating banks (Carroll and Dodd 2012; NAMA Annual Report
2018). For efficiency reasons, all transferred loans from AIB, Anglo Irish Bank, and Bank of
Ireland had to be at least €5 million; NAMA’s Board later increased the figure to €20 million
for assets held by AIB and Bank of Ireland (Oireachtas Inquiry 2016). The government
expected eligible assets to be highly concentrated among a small number of large real estate
developers (Martin 2010).
When NAMA acquired the loans, their breakdown by region and asset type was as follows:
Figure 10: Property Collateral for NAMA Loans by region and asset type
Ireland

Northern Rest of
Ireland
World

Britain

Total

Office

2,666

2,100

215

272

5,253

Retail

2,909

1,157

216

145

4,427

Other Investment

2,410

1,225

343

504

4,482

Residential

3,696

1,289

133

156

5,274

934

1,809

12

282

3,037

12,615

7,580

919

1,359

22,473

Land

4,174

1,846

279

158

6,457

Development

1,129

1,334

61

327

2,851

Total Land and Development

5,303

3,180

340

485

9,308

17,918

10,760

1,259

1,844

31,781

Hotels
Total Completed Properties

Total
%

1

0

Source: Oireachtas Inquiry 2016, 318.
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16. Acquisition (Pricing): NAMA had a detailed valuation procedure for its assets that
sought to determine long-term economic value.
NAMA’s valuation procedures were intended to clarify the value of its assets while limiting
the damage that the resulting haircuts would impose on its participants by paying the long
term economic value for the assets (which would be higher than the current market value)
(Carroll and Dodd 2012). The Irish government began collecting information for due
diligence and constructing valuation processes by May 2009, months before the NAMA Act
passed or NAMA was formally established (NAMA Acquisition of Bank Assets 2010). The
NAMA Act allowed for NAMA to purchase assets at the current market value or at any price
between the current market value and the long-term economic value so long as NAMA
consulted with the Minister for Finance. However, all of NAMA’s valuations and acquisitions
ultimately took place at long-term economic value. NAMA defined long-term economic value
for asset as “the value, as determined by NAMA, that it can reasonably be expected to attain
in a stable financial system when the crisis conditions prevailing at the passing of the Act are
ameliorated.”38 It defined long-term economic value for property as “the value, as
determined by NAMA, that it can reasonably be expected to attain in a stable financial system
when the crisis conditions prevailing at the passing of the Act are ameliorated and in which
a future price or yield of the property is consistent with the reasonable expectation having
regard to the long-term historical average.” NAMA defined the “long-term” as between
January 1, 1985 and December 31, 2005, indicating that NAMA placed the Irish property
market as only having been overvalued starting January 1, 2006 (Carroll and Dodd 2012).
NAMA constructed the long-term economic value by observing the current market value of
the asset and the assets’ collateral as of November 30, 2009 (rather than the current market
value at the time of the purchase), applying an uplift factor based on the projected increase
in the collateral’s value and a discount based on “the extent to which a participating bank has
secured its legal right to realise the underlying security” to a discounted cash flow (DCF)
valuation methodology approved by the EC (NAMA Acquisition of Bank Assets 2010).39
The actual valuation process, which took place loan-by-loan until the Irish government
received permission from the EC to simplify it in mid to late 2010, was arduous (Honohan
2019, 219). This was because the EC worried NAMA would be used to provide illegal state
aid to Irish banks (i.e. that NAMA would inflate valuations to the point where NAMA’s
purchases worked like a stealth recapitalization) (Honohan 2019).

The term asset, rather than loan, is sometimes used because NAMA also acquired some derivatives.
The EC did not specifically require the use of DCF. The 2009 IAC instead merely stated that “the Commission
would consider a transfer value reflecting the underlying long-term economic value of the assets on the basis
of underlying cash flows and broader time horizons as an acceptable benchmark indicating compatibility of the
aid amount as the minimum necessary” (See Martin 2010). Additionally, the EC noted that NAMA’s DCF
approach and the calculation of long-term economic value was appropriate “to the extent that the discount rate
and in particular the margin added to the risk-free rate is viewed as adequate” (Martin 2010).
38
39
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17. Acquisition (Pricing): NAMA possessed another clawback feature that enabled it to
get back any amount it was determined to have overpaid for assets.
NAMA’s creators integrated a valuation clawback provision (which the 2009 IAC mentioned
as a potential tactic) (Communication from the Commission 2009) into the organization. If
NAMA determined that it overpaid for an asset, NAMA could claw back the amount that it
overpaid from the participants. The NAMA Act also provided for participants to claw back
value from NAMA in cases of underpayment through a “Valuation Panel” procedure, but it is
not clear whether these reverse clawbacks were widely used (Martin 2010; National Asset
Management Agency Act 2009, Revised 2018). NAMA would determine that it overpaid by
way of:
● EC decisions on proper loan valuation procedures;
● due diligence conducted after the expedited valuation and purchase of an asset;
● realization that it had made a mistake in applying its valuation procedures; or
● the rectification of incorrect (or incomplete) information that NAMA received while
initially valuing the assets (Carroll and Dodd 2012).
18. Acquisition (Mechanics): NAMA grouped loans by common borrower and sold
them in tranches.
Once the panel of loan-value experts arrived at a valuation, NAMA grouped the loans based
on their shared relationships with a given borrower (rather than by bank) and sorted them
into tranches for transfer. Each additional tranche contained a larger number of borrowers
and smaller positions (the author of this piece hypothesizes that NAMA’s designers carved
up the assets into tranches because they anticipated that the scale of documentation
processing required to value all of the assets at once dramatically outstripped NAMA’s
administrative capacity).40 NAMA determined a transfer schedule for each tranche and
provided it to the relevant participants. The transfer schedule included the assets that NAMA
would acquire from the relevant participant and the consideration price NAMA would pay,
which would be “the lower of the amount owed by the borrower and the loan’s long-term
economic value” (NAMA Acquisition of Bank Assets 2010).
NAMA’s original intention was to value and purchase the first tranche immediately, which
would contain the largest exposures, and then do the same for a new tranche every 30 days
until an expected completion date of June or July 2010 (Houses of the Oireachtas October
2009; Houses of the Oireachtas November 2009). However, these 30-day and mid-year goals
proved overly optimistic. Although NAMA aimed to finish purchasing its assets by the end of
2010, NAMA ultimately had to revise this end date several times between 2009 and 2011
(NAMA Acquisition of Bank Assets 2010) because of issues in its participants that included
multiple management information systems (MIS), poor data management infrastructure,
The 2010-02-26 European Commission state aid decision said that “It is [was] anticipated that the first
tranche will include the 10-15 largest borrower exposures across all participating institutions” (Martin 2010).
40
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paper records, “unreliable key performance metrics,” and “[p]oor data collection capacity”
(Oireachtas Inquiry 2016).
On September 30, 2010, the Minister for Finance requested that NAMA finish transferring
assets as soon as possible and announced that “all remaining NAMA transfers should be
completed in one single tranche for each of the participating banks” (NAMA Acquisition of
Bank Assets 2010). The Minister for Finance then issued a direction and two statutory
instruments on October 22, 2010, which incorporated this goal into NAMA’s governing
documents. The direction and one of these statutory instruments added an additional
function (and processes for fulfilling said function) to NAMA: take “all necessary steps to
acquire” eligible bank assets from participants” as expeditiously as possible” (National Asset
Management Agency Act 2009, Revised 2018). The other statutory instrument amended the
March 3, 2010, statutory instrument dealing with the calculation of the “Long-Term
Economic Value of property and Bank Assets” (S.I. No. 504 2010). After consulting with
NAMA’s Board and the EC, the Minister for Finance also requested that NAMA table its
acquisition of loans from AIB and BOI where the borrower’s exposure was less than €20
million, shrinking the number of eligible assets that NAMA intended to acquire to around
€73.4 billion (NAMA Acquisition of Bank Assets 2010). On November 28, 2010, however,
Ireland’s Financial Regulator issued a statement reversing course: NAMA would now acquire
all of AIB and BOI’s exposures (including those less than €5 million) (PCAR 2011). The
Financial Regulator’s statement was codified in the National Asset Management Agency
(Amendment) Bill 2011, but the Bill was never passed, and the reversal was never
implemented (Carroll and Dodd 2012).
NAMA accordingly began an accelerated transfer of most of the assets in its remaining
tranches (three through nine) between October and December 2010 (NAMA Annual Report
2011; NAMA Progress Report 2014). NAMA would use the new valuation process “for
purposes of expedited acquisitions” to calculate the amount of consideration NAMA would
give to participants during this accelerated transfer (S.I. No. 504 2010).41 This leveraged
sampling rather than loan-by-loan valuations (Honohan 2019). In the process, NAMA
acquired these assets, it would conduct more detailed due diligence, produce a final longterm economic value for the assets, and revise its consideration cost accordingly (S.I. No. 504
2010).42 NAMA would not finish purchasing the remaining €3.4 billion in assets and
conducting due diligence on assets purchased after the fourth tranche until March 2012
(European Commission 2014). By that point, NAMA had purchased a total of €74.4 billion in
assets for €31.7 billion, leaving the participants with an average haircut of 57% (Oireachtas
Inquiry 2016). The EC officially approved these transfers on July 29, 2014 (European
Commission 2014).

In NAMA’s 2011 Annual Report, its CEO noted that “we had little information on the underlying collateral
from the participating institutions” when they acquired the assets in tranches three through nine (See NAMA
Annual Report 2011, 12).
42
After adjustments, NAMA realized its final valuation was around €0.5 billion more than its provisional
valuation and paid the banks the difference (See NAMA Progress Report 2014).
41
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19. Asset Management and Disposal: NAMA’s exit and disposal strategies were
determined based on due diligence conducted on its borrowers.
Once NAMA had acquired an asset, it effectively took the position of the participating
institution who had originally held the assets. NAMA used this legal leverage (the ability to
“take enforcement against borrowers in default”) to motivate borrowers to submit business
plans to NAMA (Carroll and Dodd 2012). However, NAMA itself did not take direct ownership
of much property (NAMA Management of Loans 2012). NAMA only directly owned €6
million worth of property and had not directly sold any of this type of property by the end of
2011.
If the borrower in question was a major borrower (as defined by NAMA), they submitted a
“realistic business plan which set out their current assets and liabilities” to NAMA within
three months of joining the scheme. Upon analyzing the business plan, NAMA then proposed
(and negotiated) short term and long term repayment strategies with the borrower (Martin
2010; Williams 2014). NAMA ultimately developed five types of strategies:
● Full Restructuring: Borrower goes through a full refinancing with new terms and
conditions.
● Partial Restructuring: Nearly the same as “Full Restructuring” but “did not result in
new loan agreements.” Instead, they set down the terms for borrower compliance in
“Connection management agreements (CMAs).”
● Support: Borrower received financial support from NAMA on the condition that it
“implement a number of milestones in relation to debt reduction.”
● Consensual Disposal: Large scale asset sale by the borrower over a “relatively shortterm horizon.”
● Enforcement: Although this was only deployed when the debtor was not cooperative
or the debtor could not demonstrate viability, this strategy involved NAMA enforcing
the debts using whatever legal powers it had at its disposal (NAMA Second Progress
Report 2018).
If NAMA and the borrower could agree on a strategy, NAMA and the borrower collaborated
on making the arrangement feasible, potentially involving, but not limited to, debt
restructurings and write-offs that the borrower would present to NAMA in a “request for
support.” If these negotiations failed (or if collaboration failed to make the agreement
feasible), NAMA asked for full repayment from the borrower, threatening enforcement
proceedings (Williams 2014).
If the borrower in question was not a major borrower, the participants would provide asset
management services, but the credit decisions were made by NAMA and NAMA was
represented in each of the banking units (Williams 2014). These borrowers would have the
relevant participant submit information on their financial performance to NAMA. Then,
NAMA would sort borrowers based on the “level of their exposure, […] creditworthiness and
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[…] level of impairment,” and prioritize the larger and more impaired borrowers for
assessment under the procedure for major borrowers “as a matter of urgency” (NAMA
Business Plan 2009). During YPFS discussions with NAMA staff, they expressed a sentiment
that, if they were to run NAMA again, they would leave less asset management
responsibilities with participating institutions or work with other firms to provide those
services (Susan McDermott and Jamie Bourke of NAMA, Zoom discussion with author,
February 26, 2021). That being said, they noted that such a strategy might not have been
viable in 2009 and 2010, as there were not as many credit and tax firms to provide such
services in Ireland.
During NAMA’s 2011 due diligence and business plan assessment process, NAMA appeared
to change its procedure for assessing the business plans of debtors managed by NAMA’s
participants. Instead of only analyzing business plans at the debtor level, NAMA began to
accept business plans at the “debtor connection, debtor or loan level depending on the
individual characteristics of each case.” NAMA also changed this procedure by adopting a
system, which NAMA called a “credit grading matrix,” for grading debtors on a combination
of debtor performance and expectations of debtor recovery, although NAMA would not fully
implement the system until 2012 (NAMA Annual Report 2012; NAMA Annual Report 2011).
On November 25, 2010, in line with NAMA’s attempt to expedite its asset purchases during
late 2010, NAMA put forward a more “streamlined” version of its “Debtor Business Plan
Requirements,” which replaced the original business plan for most debtors. The original,
which NAMA described as requiring “detailed and comprehensive information,” was
ultimately only used for “major debtors with complex corporate structures and whose loans
transferred as part of the first three tranches” (NAMA Annual Report 2010; Debtor Business
Plan Version 2 2010).
Ultimately, NAMA seemed to have a preference for disposing of its assets by sale “on the open
market by private treaty, public auction, public tender and sealed bid” (private treaty is
essentially the same as a private contract) (EBS 2017; Cas and Peresa 2016). NAMA
frequently chose to package large numbers of related loans (typically after improving the
underlying collateral) and selling them to large institutional investors (Cas and Peresa
2016).
Another feature of NAMA’s disposal strategy was how NAMA dealt with the potential conflict
between NAMA’s purpose and NAMA’s functions (as outlined in the NAMA Act). While
NAMA’s functions gave the organization a commercial primary mandate (to realize the best
value for the assets), the purposes of the NAMA Act 2009 encompassed the stabilization of
the banking system, improving liquidity, and contributing to social and economic
development (National Asset Management Agency Act 2009, Revised 2018). In practice, this
meant that NAMA would focus on its primary mandate. However, NAMA did conduct
numerous operations related to social and economic development. This included a rent
abatement program for tenants of NAMA borrowers and the demolition of “unfinished
housing estates” (more popularly known as “ghost estates”). In response to the tight credit
markets of 2012, NAMA created a vendor finance program for properties held by NAMA
borrowers and receivers in Ireland and the UK. NAMA committed up to €2 billion over four
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years for the program in May 2012, which would fund up to 75% of the purchase of
properties by making medium term loans to new investors (NAMA Second Progress Report
2018; Vendor Finance 2014). However, NAMA only provided €384 million under the facility
by the end of 2016 (NAMA Second Progress Report 2018). NAMA looked to “Ireland’s exit
from the Troika programme [the IMF program it entered in the last quarter of 2010], the
recovery in the Irish economy in recent years, increased investment in Ireland by
international investors and the wider availability of capital provided by international and
debt providers,” as well as “the introduction of Irish REITs as an alternative investment
mechanism” as an explanation of the limited demand for the program (Vendor Finance
2014).
In 2012, NAMA also introduced the Deferred Payment Initiative for residential property
purchases (NAMA Second Progress Report 2018; NAMA Deferred Payment Initiative 2014).
In the program, buyers would pay 80% of the price upfront and would pay no additional
amount if “after five years, the value of the house has fallen by 20% or more relative to its
original purchase price” (NAMA Deferred Payment Initiative 2014; NAMA Second Progress
Report 2018). In cases where, after five years, “the value of the house has fallen by less than
20% or has increased, the amount ultimately payable will be the lesser of the value of the
house or the original purchase price” (NAMA Deferred Payment Initiative 2014). The
program stopped accepting participants in May 2014, having only assisted in the purchase
of 103 properties (NAMA Second Progress Report 2018).
20. Timeframe: NAMA had a long-term strategy for managing its assets, but did not
have an organizational sunset date.
Once a loan moved onto NAMA’s balance sheet, NAMA began managing it and preparing for
its exit. NAMA anticipated that it would conduct 7-10 years of asset management and then
terminate itself. NAMA was not created with a sunset date; NAMA was to continue operating
until its Board decided the organization should be wound down (Carroll and Dodd 2012).
NAMA intended to recover about half of its investment through “partial or full restructurings,
including by supporting debtors” and the “other half [of its investment] by disposals
(consensual and enforced)” (Cas and Peresa 2016).

III. Evaluation
The EC broadly praised NAMA, stating that “By using a centralised asset protection scheme,
banks effectively reduced the burden of legacy assets and strengthened their deleveraging
and recapitalisation process.” It continued on to say that NAMA’s assets were “clearly
defined, limited in size and relatively easy to sell,” which helped NAMA manage and dispose
of its assets (European Commission 2015). Additionally, the European Commission noted
that NAMA’s profitability also benefitted “from having part of its asset portfolio located in
the UK and especially London, as this allowed for significant sales before 2013 as property
prices in the UK market started recovering earlier (around 2010) (See Figure 11). NAMA
then was able to add value to its properties and benefit from the Irish property market’s
recovery beginning in 2013 (Cas and Peresa 2016).
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Figure 11: NAMA Property Collateral disposed of by the end of 2012 by location
Collateral sold to
NAMA (November Proceeds of
2009 value in €
disposals (in €
billions)
billions)

Excess/deficit
proceeds over
November 2009 values
(in € billions)

Dublin

0.5

0.4

Rest of Ireland

0.2

0.2

Northern Ireland

0.1

0.1

London

3.6

4.7

Rest of Great Britain

0.9

0.9

Rest of world

0.5

0.5

Total

5.8

6.8

-0.1

1.1

1

Source: NAMA Progress Report 2014, 55.
Charles Enoch of the IMF lamented the impact of a “lack of a universally accepted
methodology for the valuation of assets,” which he said, “led to a protracted process whereby
bank book values were repeatedly discounted, prolonging uncertainty, delaying
normalization of bank funding, and undermining the credibility of the process” (Enoch
2013).
A review of three GFC-era asset management companies (AMCs) by the EC billed NAMA as a
success story. It pointed out NAMA as having been “the most advanced of the three” AMCs
when it came to asset sales, but argued that this was related to NAMA’s macroeconomic
situation and the fact that NAMA’s assets were homogeneous, yet spread across multiple real
estate markets. The review also commended NAMA for its tendency to sell its loans as “large
packages to institutional investors,” describing it as a tactic that helped NAMA enhance the
value of its assets. The paper continues, writing that NAMA’s expansive legal powers
improved its ability to conduct speedy asset disposals and “ensure income generation from
rentals.” With the ability to accelerate disposals of its impaired assets, NAMA was able to
help “develop a functioning secondary market for distressed assets by sending a price
signal.” However, it also noted that NAMA may have been less successful if it “had acquired
Irish residential mortgage loans” and NAMA’s practice of “adding value” to its assets could
distort the commercial property market (Cas and Peresa 2016). A World Bank study asserts
that NAMA’s success was underpinned by its homogenous asset mix; NAMA’s acquisition of
residential mortgage loans would make the AMC’s portfolio less homogenous. The same
study also partially attributes Spain’s AMC’s issues offloading its real estate assets to the
organization’s holding a mix of small residential and large commercial assets. Acquiring
residential mortgage loans would mimic this less desirable mix.
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As for the issue of NAMA’s value-addition activities potentially distorting the “ordinary
functioning of the commercial property market,” this mostly pertained to NAMA’s work
pursuing new development projects (Cas and Peresa 2016). NAMA’s size alone also did give
it influence over some of the commercial property markets in which it was involved (BBC
2011).
Additionally, it asserted that NAMA’s practice of “Combining original goals with additional
socio-economic activities” could deter NAMA from its “primary mandate” as well as
contribute to “conflicting objectives.” Perhaps most importantly, the paper noted that NAMA
had to be accompanied by other initiatives to repair the financial sector. It went on to say
that post-crisis regulatory changes would render the lessons to be learned from NAMA less
relevant in future. As for the first point, NAMA’s actions were not able to prevent Ireland
from continuing to suffer a “very high NPL ratio” and “subdued […] lending to the private
sector” (Cas and Peresa 2016). NAMA’s own annual report from 2010 buttresses this point:
For a period, it perhaps had been reasonable to anticipate that NAMA on its own
could have fixed the banking system, if the problem had been confined to the loan
categories designated for NAMA. However, the sheer scale of the banks’ problems,
which went far beyond the land and development and associated loans within
NAMA’s mandate and which only emerged after NAMA’s work had begun, meant
that [the] initial expectation was not realizable. (NAMA Annual Report 2010)
As for the second point, due to changes in the Eurostat rules, majority privately owned AMCs
like NAMA are now formally included on the government balance sheet, thus making them
difficult to implement when governments are financially constrained (Cas and Peresa 2016).
However, credit rating agencies considered NAMA debt to be on the government balance
sheet even during the organization’s early days anyways, which shows the limits of the
strategy even before it was reined in by Eurostat (European Commission 2019a; Cullinan
and Beers 2010).
The point of view of two analysts from the German Federal Statistical Office was that the
“initial impact of its [NAMA’s] operations on general government’s deficit and debt” was
effectively nil. This made NAMA “more advantageous […] in comparison to the German
liquidation sub-agencies.” However they also believed this advantage would be “to a large
extent reduced by later government payments” that happened when the Irish government
had to inject capital into a number of the participating banks to keep them in compliance
with “international equity standards” once the participating banks recognized NAMA’s
haircuts on their balance sheets (Braakman and Forster 2011).
A 2015 paper from Professor Dirk Schoenmaker of Erasmus University Rotterdam also
praised NAMA, writing that it “serves as an international example of successful management
of bad assets” (Schoenmaker 2015). In stark contrast to a World Bank study authored by
Caroline Cerruti and Ruth Neyens, Schoenmaker argued that NAMA’s decision to purchase
assets at November 30, 2009, values was a prudent one.43 He accepts NAMA’s view that the
That being said, a 2013 debate in the Oireachtas suggests that NAMA maintained the November 30, 2009
reference date due to the “regimental” requirements of calculating EU state aid (McDonagh 2013a).
43
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purchase date “protected the banks from any further deterioration of the Irish property
market” that would’ve come as a result of the 25-30 percent decline in property values after
November 30, 2009. However, he also lamented that the government did not implement a
proposal to have NAMA acquire “smaller commercial real estate loans,” popularly known as
“NAMA II.” Schoenmaker also stated that external asset management may have helped
resolve Ireland’s stock of non-performing mortgages faster, “but the ECB made such schemes
financially unattractive as it limited ECB funding to banks only, excluding resolution
vehicles” like NAMA (Cerruti and Neyens 2016; Schoenmaker 2015).
A World Bank study authored by Caroline Cerruti and Ruth Neyens gave NAMA a mixed
review (Cerruti and Neyens 2016). They praised NAMA’s asset management structure as
“offering the benefits of creating economies of scale in administering workouts, expediting
loan resolution with specific expertise, and breaking “crony capitalist” connections between
banks and developers.” They noted that NAMA’s clear commercial mandate, transparency
and independence, “efficiency in managing the assets,” and good property mix allowed for
NAMA’s “strong performance,” but did not substantially focus on NAMA’s other mandates
(such as its ability to promote social and economic development). They also complimented
NAMA for following through on “two key principles […]: no fire sales and no hoarding,” and
for professionalizing the Irish real estate market through its loan packaging program.
However, they also argued that the uplift NAMA applied to assets when calculating their
long-term economic value (ultimately an average of 8.3%) and the choice to value the assets
as of November 30, 2009, caused NAMA to overpay for its assets (because property prices
continued to fall after November 30, 2009). They note several other areas where NAMA
could have improved. Specifically, they attribute NAMA’s loss of “critical staff” to NAMA’s
failure to maintain its program of linking bonuses with performance. Similar to
Schoenmaker, they also lament that NAMA’s lack of purview over non-land and nondevelopment loans kept it from fully cleaning up the Irish banking system, but they do not
go as far as to say that NAMA should have been involved with these other loans.
This perspective, in which NAMA was an effective program, but by no means a panacea for
Ireland’s problems, is similarly reflected by the Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of
Ireland in a September 22, 2017, speech (Sibley 2017). He stated that NAMA was part of the
solution, but “was by no means the silver bullet some people may think for resolving Irish
NPLs overall, as SME and mortgage loans remained a serious and growing problem.” As
evidence, he pointed to the fact that NPLs “only peaked in Ireland in Q4 2013, with an NPL
ratio of 31.8%, more than two years after loans were transferred to NAMA.” Patrick
Honohan, the former head of Ireland’s central bank, also saw NAMA as an organization that
could not have been expected to solve Ireland’s economic woes on its own. Even if NAMA
(and/or the Irish government) had overcapitalized the banks and shrunk the haircuts that
the AMC would apply, Honohan argued that “to have done so would simply have brought
forward the melt-down that happened in the autumn” of 2010 (Honohan 2019). His belief
was that the Irish government simply did not have the fiscal capacity to handle the problem
at the point without official-sector support from abroad.
The government’s 2016 Report of the Joint Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis (the
Report) provided the opinions of NAMA’s external auditor, the Comptroller & Auditor
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General (C&AG). The C&AG argued that NAMA chose a poor way to operationalize its
mandate to seek “the best achievable financial return,” deciding to measure it through
NAMA’s ability to redeem debt instead of some kind of “expected or target rate of return”.
The C&AG also criticized NAMA for its failure to realize its anticipated rental income in 2011
(Oireachtas Inquiry 2016). The C&AG noted that NAMA’s asset purchases “removed a
considerable element of the prevailing uncertainty about the credit institutions’ financial
position in the aftermath of the banking crisis” (Oireachtas Inquiry 2015).
The 2016 Report itself criticized the government for the one-year lag between NAMA’s 2009
announcement and NAMA’s first transfers, saying that the lag caused “considerable
uncertainty and difficulty for some developers, as they were caught in a ‘no man’s land’
between their financial institutions and a NAMA not yet formally established.” It went on to
note that NAMA had negative effects on a number of the property developers who were
“borrowers” in the program. Although the report conceded that NAMA’s practice of acquiring
good assets in addition to bad assets from the participants allowed NAMA “to get more value
from individual borrowers,” it damaged the reputation of at least one borrower of a
participating institution in the process (Oireachtas Inquiry 2016).
NAMA was evaluated negatively in various left-leaning segments of Irish society as well as
in the media. One reason for this was that NAMA socialized losses related to the financial
crisis while supporting banks that ultimately still had to be bailed out and sometimes wound
down (Williams 2014, 142). Journalist Frank Connolly criticized the organization for “failing
to obtain the best return for the Irish people […] by seeking to offload the properties as
rapidly as possible” while allowing for a revolving door between NAMA’s staff, NAMA’s
executives, and the property development industry (Connelly 2017). This point of view was
echoed in one statement from the 2016 Report that “[NAMA] acted more as a debt collection
agency than as a property value maximising entity” after receiving a recommendation from
the troika to “accelerate NAMA receipts” (Oireachtas Inquiry 2016). Critics also faulted
NAMA for a perceived lack of transparency in its operations as well as for leaking confidential
information (Williams 2014).44 These criticisms tended to revolve around alleged
malpractice by NAMA in its valuation and sale of large portfolios to institutional investors,
resulting in a comprehensive investigation by the C&AG in August 2016 (C&AG 2016, 9;
Houses of the Oireachtas 2016). Finally, in March 2016, a Financial Times article reported
that developers blamed NAMA “at least partly, for Ireland’s acute housing shortage” (Boland
2016). When NAMA pivoted its activities toward property development, it also encountered
criticism from the press. Stephen Dodd, a commentator on the NAMA Act 2009, questioned
the legal basis of NAMA’s shift toward property development and the provision of affordable
housing. Stephen Dodd, a commentator on the NAMA Act 2009, later questioned the legal
basis of NAMA’s shift toward property development and the provision of affordable housing.
Discussions with NAMA staff told a more complicated story. They considered NAMA’s transparency
limitations to be a double-edged sword (Susan McDermott and Jamie Bourke of NAMA, Zoom discussion with
author, February 26, 2021). On one hand, they lamented that their Code of Conduct and compliance with the
Official Secrets Act 1963 made it difficult to fully tell their side of the story to the public sometimes. On the
other hand, if NAMA were a more transparent seller, and provided more information about its purchase
(particularly the purchase price) of specific assets, NAMA might be put at a disadvantage as a seller. This would
then hurt the taxpayer.
44
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Dodd argued that “There is no authority for policy initiatives such as the use of Nama
property for social housing unless they generate the optimal financial return compared to
alternative uses” (Dodd 2012).45 Despite the negative press, media reports acknowledge that
NAMA seemed pretty good at clearing NPLs and that non-participating banks were similarly
criticized for selling off assets to foreign “vulture funds” (Moore 2018).
NAMA’s initial April 2009 proposal prompted support in the Irish media, but this support
wavered by the time the NAMA Bill was introduced at the end of the summer (Mercille 2015).
Although government officials and NAMA’s personnel consistently reiterated that NAMA was
not a bailout and that the purpose of the organization was to clear the toxic assets off of bank
balance sheets to allow for lending, “NAMA soon became perceived in the public
consciousness as the agency through which the government put the interests of the banks
ahead of the interests of its people” (Murphy 2011). It was difficult for the public to
understand what exactly NAMA did and how NAMA would eventually help lending start
again.46 These problems were so significant that the NAMA Act was only able to pass by a
majority of four votes after a debate involving all-night meetings of the legislature (Connolly
2017).
Some continued to consider NAMA to be a bailout for developers. This was because there
was a perception that NAMA sold loans back to developers at a discount. The Public Accounts
Committee said that NAMA facilitated an “unacceptable" a lack of "systematic and routine
verification of section 172 declarations." These declarations were supposed to keep
developers from repurchasing their former properties from NAMA at a discount (Larkin
2019). According to Social Democrat TD Catherine Murphy, “the public expectation was that
someone would not be able to buy back their loans at a discount.” However, the fact that the
vast majority of NAMA’s sales were of loans rather than property and that the sales were
largely not by NAMA itself meant that section 172 was largely irrelevant (The Irish Examiner
2019).
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property.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/statutory-instrument-si-no5462009-national-asset-management-agency-determination-long-term.
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2009
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the
date
of
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(S.I.
No.
568
of
2009)
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23,
2009)
Regulation designating what assets were eligible, which was in line with the recommended
eligible assets in the NAMA Bill. https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/statutory-instrument-sino-5682009-national-asset-management-agency-designation-eligible.
S.I. No. 127 of 2010 Guidelines Issued Under Section 210(1) Of The National Asset
Management Agency Act 2009 Regarding Lending Practices And Procedures And Relating To
The Review Of Decisions Of Participating Institutions To Refuse Credit Facilities (March 26,
2010)
Regulation specifying the powers and initial operating processes for the Credit Review Office.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/guidelines-issued-under-section-2101-national-assetmanagement-agency-act-2009-regarding.
S.I. No. 504 of 2010 National Asset Management Agency (Determination of Long-Term
Economic Value of Property and Bank Assets) (Amendment) Regulations 2010 (October 22,
2010)
Regulation providing for an expedited method for valuing eligible assets and the underlying
property.
This
facilitated
the
late
2010
bulk
transfer
of
assets.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/statutory-instrument-si-no-5042010-national-assetmanagement-agency-determination-long-term.
S.I. No. 505 of 2010 National Asset Management Agency (Conferral Of Additional Function)
Order
2010
(October
22,
2010)
Regulation setting the stage for the bulk asset purchase by adding the speedy acquisition of
assets to NAMA’s list of functions. https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/statutory-instrument-sino-5052010-national-asset-management-agency-conferral-additional.
Subject: Preliminary view on the ESA95 accounting treatment of the National Asset
Management Agency (NAMA) and related majority privately owned SPV (Eurostat October
16,
2009)
Regulatory guidance on how NAMA’s operations will be reflected on the national balance sheet.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/subject-preliminary-view-esa95-accounting-treatmentnational-asset-management-agency-nama.
The Minister for Finance directs the Agency to expedite the acquisition of remaining loans
from
the
participating
institutions
(October
22,
2010)
Order from the Minister for Finance for NAMA to consolidate its outstanding tranches of assets
to be acquired into a single “bulk” tranche. https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/national-assetmanagement-agency-act-direction-under-section-14-issued-october-22-2010.
Press Releases/Announcements
Ed Sibley: Non-performing loans – the Irish perspective on a European problem Speech by
Mr Ed Sibley, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Ireland, at the second annual
conference of the ESRB, Frankfurt am Main (September 22, 2017)
Academic speech outlining the development of Ireland’s non-performing loans problem. It
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includes a number of details relevant to the extent that NAMA ameliorated the problem.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/ed-sibley-non-performing-loans-irish-perspectiveeuropean-problem.
Financial Statement of the Minister for Finance Mr Brian Lenihan, T.D. 7 April 2009
Speech by the Minister of Finance announcing measures that include the first mention of NAMA.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/financial-statement-minister-finance-mr-brian-lenihantd.
NAMA completes transfer of second tranche of loans from Anglo Irish (August 23, 2010)
Press release announcing the successful transfer of the ANGLO assets in the second tranche.
This
completed
NAMA’s
second
tranche
asset
purchase
program.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/nama-completes-transfer-second-tranche-loans-angloirish.
National Asset Management Agency - First Loan Transfers (March 30, 2010)
Press release announcing its first asset purchases and describing their book value,
consideration value, and discount rate. https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/nama-commencesloan-transfers-participating-institutions.
National Asset Management Agency - First Bank of Ireland Loans Transfer (April 2, 2010)
Press release announcing the completion of NAMA’s asset purchases related to the first tranche
of Bank of Ireland assets. https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/nama-acquires-first-bankireland-loans.
National Asset Management Agency - First AIB Loans Transfer (April 6, 2010)
Press release announcing the completion of NAMA’s asset purchases related to the first tranche
of AIB assets. https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/nama-completes-transfer-first-trancheloans-aib.
National Asset Management Agency - Tranche 2 Loans Transfer Begin (July 19, 2010)
Press release announcing the beginning of NAMA’s asset purchases related to the second
tranche of assets. https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/nama-completes-second-tranche-loantransfers-aib-boi-inbs-and-ebs.
Proposal for a National Asset Management Agency (NAMA) (April 8, 2009)
Initial proposal and justification for NAMA. https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/evaluationoptions-resolving-property-loan-impairments-and-associated-capital-adequacy.
Reports
‘Bad Banks’ in Ireland, Spain and Germany: Diverging Fortunes (October 27, 2015)
Report from Moody’s comparing and contrasting the performance of SAREB, NAMA, and FMS.
The
report
paints
NAMA
in
a
particularly
positive
light.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/bad-banks-ireland-spain-and-germany-divergingfortunes.
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Comptroller and Auditor General Special Report National Asset Management Agency
Acquisition
of
Bank
Assets
October
2010
(October
7,
2010)
First major oversight report by NAMA’s official external auditor, the Comptroller and Auditor
General of the Republic of Ireland (C&AG). https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/comptrollerand-auditor-general-special-report-national-asset-management-agency-acquisition.
Comptroller and Auditor General Special Report National Asset Management Agency
Management
of
Loans
(February
2012)
Report from NAMA’s official external auditor on the development (as well as the
implementation) of NAMA’s loan management processes. It also offers a survey of the assets in
NAMA’s portfolio. https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/comptroller-and-auditor-generalspecial-report-national-asset-management-agency-management.
Comptroller and Auditor General Special Report National Asset Management Agency
Progress
Report
2010
–
2012
(April
2014)
Report from NAMA’s official external auditor on NAMA’s overall performance over its first three
years. https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/comptroller-and-auditor-general-special-reportnational-asset-management-agency-progress.
Comptroller and Auditor General Special Report National Asset Management Agency Second
Progress
Report
(June
29,
2018)
Report from NAMA’s external auditor on the longer-term implementation of NAMA and its
progress
toward
winding
down
its
operations.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/comptroller-and-auditor-general-special-reportnational-asset-management-agency-second
Initial
Evaluation
of
NAMA
Operations
(December
6,
2011)
Pro-bono, high-level (management consulting style) analysis of NAMA’s early operations. Some
of
its
findings
contributed
to
NAMA’s
2012
reorganization.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/letter-and-report-minister-finance.
NAMA
Annual
Reports
for
2010-2018
Section of NAMA’s website containing its annual reports and companying presentations for
2010 to 2018. https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/national-asset-management-agencyannual-reports-webpage.
Nama
Business
Plan
(June
30,
2010)
Presentation outlining NAMA’s first official business plan (how NAMA intended to operate) as
well as the results of NAMA’s first tranche. https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/nama-businessplan-30th-june-2010.
NAMA
Key
Tranche
1
Data
(May
10,
2010)
Presentation outlining the surprising results from the first tranche of asset purchases.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/nama-key-tranche-1-data-may-10-2010.
NAMA one year later – A Lombard Street Research Report for the Construction Industry
Federation November 2010 NAMA – a flawed idea and a failure (November 2010)
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Privately commissioned report on NAMA from the point of view of the Construction Industry
Federation. The report is critical of NAMA and it appears to be for advocacy purposes.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/nama-one-year-later-lombard-street-research-reportconstruction-industry-federation.
NAMA QUARTERLY REPORT (Section 55 NAMA Act 2009) (June 30, 2010)
NAMA’s second quarterly financial report of its activities from its establishment to June 30,
2010.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/section-55-quarterly-report-nama-act-2009quarterly-financial-statements.
Patrick Honohan: Recapitalisation of failed banks – some lessons from the Irish experience
(September
7,
2012)
Speech-cum-academic paper with a useful description of the recapitalizations preceding and
following NAMA’s asset purchases. It also provides a useful outline of the impact of NAMA’s
initially
overly
optimistic
performance
estimates
for
its
portfolio.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/recapitalization-failed-banks-some-lessons-irishexperience.
Stabilising and Healing the Irish Banking System: Policy Lessons (January 12, 2015)
Short academic paper giving commentary on Ireland’s overall crisis response. There’s a
particularly relevant section looking at the potential (but rejected) expansion of NAMA.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/4145.
Treatment of Special Bank Interventions in Irish Government Statistics (2011)
Paper coming from the Central Bank of Ireland and Ireland’s Central Statistics Office that
analyzes how the various guarantees, nationalizations, capital injections, and asset purchases
interacted
with
Irish
and
European
sovereign
debt
accounting
rules.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/treatment-special-bank-interventions-irishgovernment-statistics.
What Makes a Good ‘Bad Bank’? The Irish, Spanish and German Experience (May 24, 2016)
Report from European Commission analysts putting together best practices from three public
asset management companies implemented within the European Commission during the GFC.
It also contains a useful discussion of changing Eurostat regulations and the growing relevance
of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) to the operation of such companies.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/3681.
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